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Abstract 
Morality clauses give a contracting party the right to 
terminate if the other party behaves badly or embarrassingly. A 
curious product of twentieth-century Hollywood, these contract 
clauses have traditionally been used to control the antics of 
entertainers and athletes. The current politically-sensitive 
historical moment, combined with the internet’s ability to 
broadcast widely and permanently, has put everyone’s off-duty 
speech, conduct, and reputation under the microscope. Media 
reports detailing people’s digital falls from grace abound. For fear 
of negative association, businesses are more attuned than ever to 
the extracurricular acts of their agents and associates—and are 
increasingly binding them to morality clauses that allow for 
abrupt separations.  
However, morality clauses have largely escaped judicial and 
academic scrutiny. Perhaps due to the hefty bargaining power of 
their traditionally famous parties, most courts have generally 
found these clauses enforceable with fleeting analysis. Outside of 
the sports and entertainment industries, academic literature on 
the morality clause is scant. 
We ignore morality clauses at our peril. Like non-compete 
clauses, which suffer from well-documented overuse and 
overbreadth, morality clauses can be socially harmful. Their 
unrestricted use allows and invites unpredictability, bad faith, 
and broad limitations on expression, privacy, and other liberties. 
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This is especially true when imposed on low-profile agents with 
little bargaining power. 
Unlike the well-trodden area of non-competes, there is no 
uniform rubric for assessing whether and to what extent morality 
clauses are enforceable, fairly imposed, and lawfully interpreted. 
This Article addresses this gap, offering to courts and jurists alike 
a five-factor test by which to determine the validity of morality 
clauses in a world where reputation pervades and the line between 
home and office is blurred. 
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I. Introduction 
Since the beginning of time, people have sought to get out of 
deals because they no longer wanted to be associated with the 
other party in the public’s view. Maybe the offending party broke 
the law, embarrassed himself, or stated an unpopular political 
opinion. Or perhaps the desired rupture had more to do with a 
soured relationship, bad faith, or even discrimination. 
Morality clauses1 generally grant a contracting party the 
right to terminate if the other party behaves in an objectionable 
manner or attracts disrepute.2 These unilateral contract 
provisions are usually broadly drafted, allowing for expansive 
and often highly-subjective interpretations.3 A product of the 
twentieth century, morality clauses found their genesis with 
                                                                                                     
 1. Morality clauses are sometimes referred to as morals, moral turpitude, 
public image, role model, personal conduct, behavioral or good conduct clauses. 
For consistency, we refer to them as morality clauses throughout. 
 2. See Seth William Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey: Goosen v. 
Commissioner Remains a Fairway to Characterize Endorsement Income for 
Nonresident Alien Athletes in Garcia v. Commissioner, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD 
SPORTS L.J. 605, 622 (2013) [hereinafter Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey] 
(explaining how morality clauses protect endorsed parties in endorsement 
contracts from damage to their reputation caused by the endorsee’s disreputable 
behavior as well as from subsequent devaluation of the endorsement caused by 
the endorsee’s damaged image). 
 3. See Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares 
About Morals? An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What 
Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347, 370 (2009) 
[hereinafter Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?] (describing 
the broad provisions preferred by employers such as companies and major 
sports leagues). 
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libertine actors in the Roaring Twenties4 and have grown to near-
universality in the sports and entertainment industries today.5  
To date, almost all of the legal scholarship on morality 
clauses focuses on high-profile personalities in 
endorsement-related agreements.6 However, these contract 
                                                                                                     
 4. See id. at 354 (explaining how declining film attendance rates, 
attributed to actors’ off-screen misbehavior, led to early examples of morality 
clauses in talent contracts). 
 5. See id. at 363–64 (describing the prevalence of morality clauses in the 
contracts of professional athletes, entertainers, and corporate executives).   
 6. See generally id. (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements); 
Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete 
Endorsement Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection] (discussing 
morality clauses in athlete endorsement agreements); Porcher L. Taylor, III. et 
al., The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save Talent’s Reputation 
and Money in a New Era of Corporate Crimes and Scandals, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 65 (2010) [hereinafter Taylor, III. et al., The Reverse-Morals Clause] 
(discussing reverse-morals clauses in talent agreements); Adam Epstein, An 
Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 5 (2011) 
[hereinafter Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports] 
(discussing morality clauses in professional sports); Paul A. Czarnota, Athlete 
Privacy Rights and Endorsement Contracts: An Analysis of U.S., U.K., and 
Australian Law, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 460 (2012) (same); Joshua S.E. Lee & 
Jaimie K. McFarlin, Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: Comparative Analysis 
of Management, Owner, and Athletic Discipline in the NFL & NBA, 23 JEFFREY 
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69 (2016) (same). Morality clauses have been a popular 
topic for student notes and practitioner literature. See generally Stern, supra 
note 2 (discussing morality clauses in professional sports); Noah B. Kressler, 
Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical 
Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235 (2005) [hereinafter Kressler, Using the Morals 
Clause] (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements); Andrew Zarriello, A 
Call to the Bullpen: Alternatives to the Morality Clause as Endorsement 
Companies’ Main Protection Against Athletic Scandal, 56 B.C. L. REV. 389 (2015) 
(discussing morality clauses in athletic endorsement agreements); Kira N. 
Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses: Presumed Guilty Unless 
Proven Innocent, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 367 (2015) 
[hereinafter Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses] (discussing 
morality clauses in professional sports); Caroline Epstein, Morals Clauses: Past, 
Present and Future, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 72 (2015) [hereinafter 
Epstein, Morals Clauses] (discussing morality clauses in entertainment 
industries); Sarah D. Katz, Note, “Reputations . . . A Lifetime to Build, Seconds 
to Destroy”: Maximizing the Mutually Protective Value of Morals Clauses in 
Talent Agreements, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185 (2011) [hereinafter Katz, 
Note, Reputations] (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements); Lauren 
Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less: A Look at Morals Clauses in Athlete 
Endorsement Agreements, 11 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 
(2015) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less] (discussing morality 
clauses in athletic endorsement agreements); Nathan Law, Manufacturing a 
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clauses have slowly and quietly found their way into contracts 
and enforceable employee handbooks at all levels.7 As one author 
put it, “any talented individual who is or may become associated 
with a company or organization in the minds of the public is 
likely to have a morals clause included in his or her contract.”8 
And given the ubiquity of social media and the ease and 
permanence of digital information, virtually anyone can become 
associated with a company or organization in the minds of the 
public. Authors, teachers, executives, board members, donors, 
franchisors, and even rank-and-file employees are often subject to 
contractual restrictions on off-duty behavior and potential 
ensuing embarrassment.9 
Morality clauses have generally been held to be valid and 
enforceable as applied to high-profile figures.10 One could rightly 
argue that the precept of freedom of contract allows parties the 
latitude to bargain and create the terms of their own agreements. 
Moreover, few can dispute the laudable ends of curtailing 
someone’s right to behave badly. 
However, it does not follow that these curious contract 
clauses should escape scrutiny. Any contract clause that broadly 
and vaguely restricts civil liberties deserves close inquiry, 
                                                                                                     
Run: How Major League Baseball Can Use the Morals Clause to Clean Up 
Baseball, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2015) (discussing morality clauses in 
professional baseball); Sarah Osborn Hill, How to Protect Your Brand When 
Your Spokesperson Is Behaving Badly: Morals Clauses in Spokesperson 
Agreements, 57 FED. LAW. 14 (2010) (discussing morality clauses in endorsement 
agreements). 
 7. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 365–66 (describing morality clauses for models, authors, multimedia 
designers, and others). 
 8. Id. at 366. 
 9. Some professions charged with public trust and safety have morality 
requirements made explicit by statute or governing rules. Lawyers are an 
obvious example. Other examples include air transport pilots, who are required 
by the Federal Aviation Regulations to maintain “good moral character.” 14 
C.F.R. § 61.153(c). Police officers are another example, and are required by state 
law to maintain good moral character generally. See, e.g., FL. STAT. § 943.13(7) 
(2013). These examples are beyond the scope of this Article, as they are not 
contractual in nature. 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 (AM. LAW INST. 1958) 
(discussing an agent’s duty not to bring disrepute upon the principal); Taylor, 
III. et al., supra note 6, at 105 n.237 (describing the enforceability of morality 
clauses against television actors, directors, and screenwriters). 
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especially when imposed on parties with little bargaining power. 
Non-compete clauses, which restrain trade in the name of a 
principal’s business interest, suffer from similar overuse and 
overbreadth.11 Both clauses have gained popularity in the modern 
business environment, as employers grasp for more control in a 
globalized and interconnected world.12 Unlike morality clauses, 
however, the law of non-competes is well-trodden—their use is 
strictly regulated by state legislatures and examined by courts 
with well-established tests for their validity.13 Recent reports of 
their overuse have even elicited White House response.14  
Morality clauses, on the contrary, have been largely ignored. 
There is much that current law leaves unanswered. Under what 
circumstances should a court invalidate a morality clause? Are 
the current rules—formulated throughout almost a century of 
cases about famous people—applicable to a clerk, a product 
manager, or a baggage handler? In the age of social media and 
political correctness, how should courts measure the dauntingly 
slippery concepts of “public disrepute” or “public scandal”? When 
is enforcing a morality clause necessary for protecting a 
legitimate business interest? When is it simply a pretext for bad 
faith or discrimination? 
A review of the extant case law and literature reveals an 
obvious gap in this highly-subjective area of contract law—there 
                                                                                                     
 11. See Jonathan L. Israel, State Attorneys General on the Attack Against 
Noncompete Overuse, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nat 
lawreview.com/article/state-attorneys-general-attack-against-noncompete-overuse 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing enforcement reactions against the overuse 
of non-compete agreements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 12. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note 
6, at 78 (explaining the enhanced demand for morality clauses in the modern era 
of social media and reduced privacy). 
 13. See generally Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law 
of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy 
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 (2008) (providing an overview of state and 
federal systems of regulating non-compete agreements). 
 14. See generally Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential 
Issues, and State Responses, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf 
(“These agreements currently impact nearly a fifth of U.S. workers, including a 
large number of low-wage workers. This brief delineates issues regarding 
misuse of non-compete agreements and describes a sampling of state laws and 
legislation to address the potentially high costs of unnecessary non-competes to 
workers and the economy.”). 
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is no uniform rubric for assessing whether and to what extent 
morality clauses are enforceable, fairly imposed, and lawfully 
interpreted. 
This Article proposes to address this gap, offering to courts 
and jurists alike an organizational lens through which to analyze 
morality clauses. Part II provides an overview of the history and 
justifications of morality clauses. It also discusses the impact of 
the democratization of information flow on the market for 
morality clauses. The internet, and particularly social media, has 
expanded the reach of the average person’s speech and behavior. 
Any individual with company ties can ostensibly affect a 
company’s reputation negatively, at least by association. A second 
aggravating factor affecting the implementation and 
interpretation of modern morality clauses is the current 
sensitivity in public discourse, commonly referred to as political 
correctness. Part III of the Article discusses the legal and public 
policy issues inherent in morality clauses, especially as applied to 
non-public figures. In Part IV, we present a multi-factor test to 
ascertain to what extent morality clauses are enforceable. Each 
factor of the proposed analysis is buttressed by established legal 
principles and social science. Looking at morality clauses through 
the lens of this five-pronged analysis will allow for their more 
efficient, balanced, and just use and enforcement as against a 
variety of contracting parties. 
II. Morality Clauses: Taxonomy and Evolution 
A “morality clause”15 is a contractual provision that gives one 
contracting party (usually a company) the unilateral right to 
terminate the agreement, or take punitive action against the 
other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is 
sought) in the event that such other party engages in 
reprehensible behavior or conduct that may negatively impact his 
or her public image and, by association, the public image of the 
                                                                                                     
 15. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 351 n.10 (“The term ‘morals clause’ . . . has several alternative 
formulations. These analogous counterparts include . . . ‘morality clauses.’” 
(quoting Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete 
Endorsement Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2005))). 
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contracting company.16 Such clauses can prohibit a variety of 
behaviors and consequences depending on the breadth of the 
language used.17  
A. Taxonomy 
For ease of reference, we will refer to two general types of 
morality clauses: those prohibiting certain behavior outright 
(“Bad Behavior clauses”) and those prohibiting the backlash or 
reputational consequences of bad acts, sometimes measured by a 
public outcry, scandal, or ridicule (“Reputational Impact 
clauses”).18 Although these terms are neither technical nor widely 
used, they are helpful for our purposes in distinguishing the two 
most common types of restrictions in morality clauses.19 One 
should also note that they are not mutually exclusive, as some 
contracts may contain both prohibitions.20 
1. Bad Behavior Clauses 
At their most narrow and defined, some morality clauses 
contain outright prohibitions on certain unwanted behavior, 
irrespective of the act’s impact or association.21 For instance, a 
narrowly drafted clause could cover behavior such as failing a 
drug test, an arrest, or conviction of a crime.22 Broader morality 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. at 351. 
 17. See Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less, supra note 6, at 132 
(explaining that morality clauses “cover illegal drug use, drug dependency, 
criminal conduct, and public criticism injuring the athlete or endorser’s 
reputation or the value of the endorser,” among a plethora of other behaviors). 
 18. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 224–26 (providing a 
comprehensive classification of the various examples of morality clauses in 
different industries). 
 19. See id. at 189 (discussing the “inefficacy of the two morals clause 
models currently used in U.S. and international talent agreements: (1) the 
‘morality’ trigger; and (2) the ‘disrepute’ trigger”). 
 20. See id. at 218 (describing that talent agreements that use morality and 
disrepute triggers fail to “maximize the protective value of morals clauses”). 
 21. See id. at 202 (stating that “during the heyday of the Hollywood studio 
system,” standard contracts encompassed basically everything pursuant to a 
contract signee’s life). 
 22. See id. at 202–03 (discussing that a clause prohibiting interracial 
CONTRACTING CORRECTNESS 11 
clauses may encompass any conduct that is outside of public 
morals or decency or acceptable social norms.23 
One example is found in the 1918 case of Ackerman v. 
Siegel24—the earliest reported morality clause case.25 In this case, 
an employer included a provision in an employee’s written 
contract that simply prohibited the employee’s “bad behavior or 
fast living.”26 When the employer discovered that the employee 
secretly charged an extra fee to customers, the employer 
terminated the contract.27 The employee brought a claim for 
unlawful discharge, and the New York Supreme Court found that 
the employer rightfully terminated the agreement under the 
morality clause.28 
2. Reputational Impact Clauses 
Instead of forbidding certain definite acts or, much more 
generally—indecency or bad behavior at large—some morality 
clauses are even less self-defining. That is, the act triggering 
termination is not measured by its own substance, but rather by 
the effect that it produces in the community, or, more specifically, 
on the other contracting party.29 These clauses generally contain 
language prohibiting acts that offend the community, or that 
reflect unfavorably on either of the contracting parties30 or bring 
                                                                                                     
dating once existed). 
 23. See Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey, supra note 2, at 622 (discussing 
clauses concerning athletes who compete in tournaments, such as clauses 
reflecting that athlete’s image and mandatory attendance of particular 
tournaments). 
 24. 170 N.Y.S. 522 (App. Term 1918). 
 25. See id. at 523 (“The conduct of the plaintiff in soliciting the alleged 
commission was certainly behavior tending to imperil the morals and success of 
defendant’s shop.”). 
 26. Id. at 522. 
 27. Id. at 522–23. 
 28. Id. at 523. 
 29. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 213 (discussing actor 
Michael Nader’s suit against ABC when ABC terminated Nader’s contract 
because of his arrest for selling cocaine to an undercover police officer that ABC 
claimed tainted its programs (citing Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 Fed. 
App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2005))). 
 30. See Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less, supra note 6, at 132 (“In 
12 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2017) 
the offending party “into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or 
ridicule, or tend to shock, insult or offend the majority of the 
consuming public or any protected class or group thereof.”31 A 
public outcry, scandal or adverse reaction is evidence that the act 
has negatively affected the reputation of one or both parties.32 
Other contracts adopt a broader approach, requiring no 
evidence of a scandal, only a unilateral assessment that 
reputational harm has occurred.33 The morals clause found in 
NFL player contracts is an example: it allows a team to 
unilaterally fire a player if he has engaged in conduct deemed to 
adversely affect, or reflect on, the team.34 Based on the language, 
it is plausible to conclude that a team could terminate a player if 
in its sole discretion it believes his behavior could adversely affect 
or reflect on the team, regardless of actual damage. 
B. The Logic and Evolution of Morality Clauses 
However worded or classified, the logic behind morality 
clauses is relatively straightforward and intuitive: organizations 
want to be able to disassociate from reputational hazards for fear 
of the negative spillover effect caused by an actor’s bad 
                                                                                                     
general, a morals clause may include behavior that ‘(a) is not ‘with due regard’ 
to ‘social conventions and public morals and decency’; (b) ‘shocks, insults or 
offends’ the community; or (c) ‘reflects unfavorably’ on the person, the financier, 
the producer, the employer, or the distributor.” (quoting THOMAS D. SELZ, 
MELVIN SIMENSKY & PATRICIA NASSIF ACTON, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL 
CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 9:107 (2013))). 
 31. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (M.D.N.C. 
2012). 
 32. See id. at 719–23 (discussing that due to Mendenhall’s tweets, he 
received public scrutiny regarding the words that he was putting on the 
internet). 
 33. See Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection, supra note 6, at 
10 (“The parties should determine ahead of time whether a unilateral decision 
on the part of the company is sufficient for termination.”). 
 34. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N, 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 260 (2011), https://nfllabor.files. 
wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf (explaining 
that under § 11 of the NFL Player Contract, a football club may terminate the 
player contract “[i]f at any time, in the sole judgment of the Club . . . [the] 
Player has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by the Club to 
adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club . . . .”). 
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behavior.35 The underlying assumption, of course, is that an 
individual with ties to the organization—whether an official 
endorser or an employee wearing the company uniform—
represents the organization in the public’s eyes.36 Thus, their acts 
and reputation are attributable to the company and its 
products.37 
The power of association is well documented in philosophy 
and psychology. Consumer behavior research also supports the 
notion. In the late 1980s, consumer studies professor, Grant 
McCracken, articulated this phenomenon as “meaning 
transfer.”38 His theory suggests that an endorser’s cultural 
meaning flows through consumer goods and ultimately transfers 
to the consumer’s life.39 That is, celebrity endorsers carry cultural 
meanings (i.e., allusions to status, class, gender, lifestyle, and 
values).40 The advertising system enables a metaphoric 
transference of these meanings to products.41 Consumers then 
“take possession of these meanings and put them to work in the 
construction of their notions of self and the world.”42 More recent 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 352 (describing that morality clauses “protect the contracting company 
from the immoral behavior of the talent with whom it contracts” (citing Noah B. 
Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and 
Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235 (2005))). 
 36. See id. at 349 (“[T]oday’s increasingly public society, where the 
proliferation of tabloids, celebrity gossip blogs, and news magazines inundate 
the public with information on talent’s personal lives . . . .”). 
 37. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 191 (“[T]he non-talent’s 
industry determines the manner in which the talent’s image will be used to 
generate beneficial value for non-talent . . . .”). 
 38. Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of 
the Structure and Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J. 
CONSUMER RES. 71, 74 (1986) [hereinafter McCracken, Culture and 
Consumption]. 
 39. See id. at 71 (“Cultural meaning flows continually between its several 
locations in the social world, aided by the collective and individual efforts of 
designers, producers, advertisers, and consumers.”). 
 40. See id. at 76 (“Motion picture and popular music stars, revered for their 
status, their beauty, and sometimes their talent . . . . [I]nvent and deliver a 
species of meaning that has been largely fashioned from the prevailing cultural 
coordinates established by cultural categories and cultural principles.”). 
 41. See id. (“These opinion leaders are permeable to cultural innovations, 
changes in style, value, and attitude, which they then pass along to the 
subordinate parties who imitate them.”). 
 42. Grant McCracken, Who Is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural 
14 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 (2017) 
elaborations on this theory suggest that negative associations are 
more likely to transfer to a brand than positive ones.43 It is 
through these natural associations that consumers come to 
approve or reject products as symbolic of their own lives.44 It 
stands to reason then, that a company representative who 
behaves badly will engender negative associations in consumers’ 
minds, and these will likely be reflected onto the company’s 
product. 
It was exactly this fear of a negative association—and impact 
on the bottom line—that became the first major catalyst for the 
use of morality clauses in the early 1920s.45 As the media 
increasingly reported on the debaucherous behavior of Hollywood 
stars, the American public began to condemn their allegedly wild 
lifestyles.46 As ticket sales decreased considerably, the movie 
industry blamed the actors’ behavior and the subsequent media 
reports for their downturn and, as a result, started including Bad 
Behavior Clauses in movie contracts.47 
                                                                                                     
Foundations of the Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 310, 314 (1989). 
 43. See Margaret Campbell & Caleb Warren, A Risk of Meaning Transfer: 
Are Negative Associations More Likely to Affect Transfer Than Positive 
Associations?, 7 SOC. INFLUENCE & CONSUMER BEHAV. 172, 172 (2012) (“Three 
studies show that brands are more likely to acquire the negative than the 
positive personality traits associated with a celebrity endorser and that negative 
associations transfer even under conditions that inhibit the transfer of positive 
associations.”). 
 44. See id. (“[B]rands acquire associations through links with other cultural 
entities, including . . . products . . . .”). 
 45. See Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses, supra note 6, 
at 378 (“The moral turpitude clause originated during the Roaring ‘20s in 
Hollywood, California.” (citing Mark Kesten, Reputation Insurance: Why 
Negotiating for Moral Reciprocity Should Emerge as a Much Needed Source of 
Protection for the Employee, CORNELL HR REV. (Nov. 23, 2012), 
http://www.cornellhrreview.org/reputation-insurance-why-negotiating-for-moral-reci 
procity-should-emerge-as-a-much-needed-source-of-protection-for-the-employee/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review))). 
 46. See id. at 378–79 (discussing that since there was an “increase in the 
media’s interest in reporting” the illicit acts of movie stars, certain movie 
studios “promulgated morals clauses” to “shield” themselves from imputed 
negative reputation). 
 47. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 354 (“Much of the focus of the press was on the individual movie stars, 
whose ‘garish and scandalous’ behavior was often blamed for declines in film 
attendance.” (quoting Auerbach, Morals Clauses As Corporate Protection, supra 
note 6, at 3)). 
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In 1921, shortly after signing a three million dollar contract 
with Paramount Pictures, comedian Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle was 
accused of the rape and murder of a young female guest of one of 
his parties.48 The state brought charges after a witness told police 
she had heard screaming coming from a room in which Arbuckle 
had gone with the guest.49 Although he was later acquitted of the 
crimes, his public image was irreparably damaged.50 As a result, 
the benefit Paramount stood to gain from his lucrative contract 
diminished greatly.51 The case has since been said to have 
inspired production companies to include morality clauses in 
talent agreements.52 In fact, later that same year, Universal 
Studios began inserting the following clause into all of its actor 
and director contracts: 
The actor (actress) agrees to conduct himself (herself) with due 
regard to public conventions and morals and agrees that he 
(she) will not do or commit anything tending to degrade him 
(her) in society or bring him (her) into public hatred, contempt, 
scorn or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the 
community or outrage public morals or decency, or tending to 
the prejudice of the Universal Film Manufacturing Company 
or the motion picture industry. In the event that the actor 
(actress) violates any term or provision of this paragraph, then 
the Universal Film Manufacturing Company has the right to 
cancel and annul this contract by giving five (5) days’ notice to 
the actor (actress) of its intention to do so.53 
                                                                                                     
 48. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note 
6, at 76 (discussing that Fatty hosted a party where a female guest was “found 
severely injured in his hotel suite,” and that she later died). 
 49. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note Error! Bookmark not 
defined., at 236 (citing Sam Stoloff, Fatty Arbuckle and the Black Sox: The 
Paranoid Style of American Popular Culture, 1919–1922, in HEADLINE 
HOLLYWOOD: A CENTURY OF FILM SCANDAL 56 (Adrienne L. McClean & David A. 
Cook eds., 2001)). 
 50. See id. (“Public opinion quickly turned against the comedian as 
newspapers nationwide gave the story front-page coverage.” (citing ROBERT H. 
STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY 
180 (Hastings House Pub. 1978))). 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 237 (discussing how studios started adding morality clauses 
“to quickly disassociate from” scandalous behaviors deemed reprehensible by the 
public and media). 
 53. Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3, 
at 355 n.30. 
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The next major historical phase for morality clauses occurred 
between the late 1940s and early 1960s. At this time, the United 
States was in the midst of the McCarthy era—a period known for 
its extreme fear and condemnation of Communism.54 In 1947, as 
part of the government’s phobia of the far left, the congressional 
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held nine days 
of hearings to investigate the alleged Communist infiltration of 
Hollywood’s motion picture industry.55 Throughout the hearings, 
HUAC cited ten “unfriendly” witnesses for contempt of Congress 
when they refused to answer questions relating to whether they 
had ever associated with the Communist party.56 
No one wanted to be associated with an alleged Communist. 
Studios fired the witnesses based on their alleged involvement in 
Communist activities.57 Subsequently, three of the witnesses 
sued their respective employers, alleging that their terminations 
were based on unjustly expansive readings of the morality 
clauses in their contracts.58 One was Lester Cole, who had been 
employed as a screenwriter for Loew’s, Inc., doing business as 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer films (MGM).59 Cole’s employment was 
pursuant to a written agreement, which included the following 
morality clause: 
The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to 
public conventions and morals, and agrees that he will not do 
or commit any act or thing that will tend to degrade him in 
society or bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn or 
ridicule, or that will tend to shock, insult or offend the 
community or ridicule public morals or decency, or prejudice 
                                                                                                     
 54. See Robert M. Lichtman, McCarthyism and the Court: The Need for “an 
Uncommon Portion of Fortitude in the Judges,” 39 J.  SUP. CT. HIST. 107, 108 
(2014) (“The Court’s McCarthy era, which (in this reading) spanned the October 
1949 through 1961 Terms . . . .”). 
 55. Id. at 109. 
 56. See Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1950) (“When Cole 
was called to the stand he was asked ‘Are you now or have you ever been a 
member of the Communist Party?’ The statement he then made was interpreted 
by the committee as a refusal to answer . . . .”). 
 57. See id. (stating that after Cole was called as a witness he “was sent a 
notice of suspension” that discussed his refusal “to answer certain questions put 
to [him] by such committee”). 
 58. See id. at 641 (summarizing that plaintiff did not believe that his 
testimony warranted a violation of the employment agreement). 
 59. Id. at 644–45. 
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the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio industry 
in general.60 
After Cole was cited for contempt of Congress, MGM 
terminated his agreement.61 In his breach of contract case, the 
Ninth Circuit held that MGM properly terminated Cole under the 
agreement for two reasons. First, the court concluded that Cole’s 
misdemeanor conviction was within the scope of the morality 
clause.62 Second, the court reasoned that Cole’s refusal to answer 
questions regarding his alleged association with Communists 
could be—and was publicly—interpreted as affirming his belief in 
Communism.63 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because “a large 
segment of the public did look upon Communism and 
Communists as things of evil, . . . it cannot be said, as a matter of 
law, that in acting as he did Cole did not breach [the] 
agreement.”64 
The Ninth Circuit subsequently heard cases from two more of 
the ten convicted witnesses who were employed and terminated 
pursuant to very similar morality clauses.65 In each case, the 
court affirmed its reasoning in Cole and found that the alleged 
Communists violated their employment contracts and were 
rightfully terminated.66 
                                                                                                     
 60. Id. at 645. 
 61. See id. (“Cole was . . . sent a notice of suspension reading as follows: 
‘Dear Mr. Cole . . . you refused to answer certain questions put to you . . . . By 
your failure to answer these questions . . . . [T]his is to notify you that we have 
elected to suspend your employment . . . .’”). 
 62. Se id. at 648 (“We think it rather elementary that one who, for 
whatever motive, chooses to conduct himself in such manner as to be guilty of a 
misdemeanor as serious as this one can hardly be said to be doing so ‘with due 
regard to public conventions.’”). 
 63. See id. at 649 (“We think that a jury might well find as a fact that the 
natural result of Cole’s refusal to say whether he was . . . a member of the 
Communist party . . . was for the purpose of concealing his actual membership 
in the party.”). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1957) 
(“We are confident that the morals clause in Scott’s contract was no weaker from 
management’s position than Lardner’s. If there be shades of the two, Scott’s 
clause was the stronger or stricter.”); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. 
Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1954) (“One may observe that Lardner’s 
contract said everything that Cole’s said and a little more.”).  
 66. See Scott, 240 F.2d at 91 (citing both Cole’s and Lardner’s contracts, the 
court went on to say that an “opposite result in two companion cases so nearly 
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In more recent years, morality clauses have become de rigeur 
in endorsement agreements involving advertisers, television 
personalities, movie stars, models, authors, and athletes.67 While 
a 1997 survey found that less than half of all endorsement 
contracts included morals clauses, in 2003 that number had risen 
to at least 75%.68 The National Football League, National 
Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major 
League Baseball now all have standard player agreements that 
include morality clauses.69 
The increasing popularity of morality clauses has spread 
beyond the realm of the sports and entertainment industries and 
into the corporate world.70 Today, high-level corporate officers 
have also become frequent subjects of media spotlight.71 One 
recent study found that of 375 CEO employment contracts, 271 
included such clauses.72 Further, moral turpitude has become one 
of the most commonly listed reasons for a company terminating a 
CEO.73 
                                                                                                     
alike would discredit the law”); Lardner, 216 F.2d at 850 (“The law of this circuit 
having been established by Cole’s case . . . it is appropriate that the implication 
of the same condition be made here.”). 
 67. See Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection, supra note 6, at 
3 (“As important as the selection and negotiation process is for companies, they 
can never be entirely certain that an endorser’s image is bulletproof. To hedge 
against much of this risk, corporate employers are more often insisting on 
stricter contractual protections, primarily through the inclusion of so-called 
‘morals clauses.’”). 
 68.  Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3, 
at 356. 
 69. Id. at 356–57. 
 70. See id. at 364 (“Morals clauses are also commonly employed in 
agreements between corporations and their most talented executives, such as 
‘C-level’ executives.”). 
 71. See Patricia Sanchez Abril & Ann M. Olazabal, The Celebrity CEO: 
Corporate Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. 
L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2010) (“We posit that it is the confluence of three historical 
trends that has thrust CEOs onto center stage: higher levels of investment by 
average folk, dramatically increased availability of detailed personal 
information, and the reemergence of controversial business issues in popular 
debate.”). 
 72. Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3, 
at 364 (citing Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis 
of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 231, 248 (2006)). 
 73. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of 
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The increasing incidence of morality clauses is no accident. 
Several external factors, which we discuss in turn below, have led 
to the rise of such clauses, as well as their use to terminate 
agreements: (1) the rebirth of political correctness,74 (2) the 
ubiquity of social media and a reputation-centric economy,75 and 
(3) the increasing political and values-based engagement of 
businesses.76 
1. Political Correctness and Sensitivity 
In early 2016, professional boxer Manny Pacquiao ran for a 
senate seat in his native Philippines.77 During his campaign, he 
publicly described homosexuals as “worse than animals.”78 
Subsequently, the sports apparel brand, Nike, terminated a 
nearly eight-year endorsement agreement with Pacquiao—
presumably pursuant to a morality clause.79 Today, offensive, 
insensitive, and otherwise unpopular statements seem to land 
celebrities and everyday people in hot water on a regular basis, 
bringing about a long and widespread debate on tolerance, free 
speech, and the merits of political correctness.80 
                                                                                                     
CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 231, 248 (2006) (noting that 271 out of 375 terminations of 
employment contracts were for moral turpitude, showing that it was part of the 
“most common contractual bases” for terminating a CEO). 
 74. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that the rise in political correctness has 
led to the promulgation of certain morality clauses that allow companies to 
avoid guilt by association when such scrutiny arises).  
 75. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing that due to the ability to reach a mass 
audience much easier today via the internet and social media, which can have 
severe dire consequences for both an employer and the employee). 
 76. See infra Part II.B.3 (stating that since businesses may also get 
involved in political speech, and express values of their own, morality clauses 
have been made to allow such business to terminate and separate from views or 
speech that is antithetical to their stance on certain issues). 
 77. Darren Rovell, Nike Cuts Ties with Manny Pacquiao After Derogatory 
Comments, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2016), http://espn.go.com/boxing/story/_/id/14793389/ 
nike-ends-endorsement-contract-manny-pacquiao (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
[hereinafter Rovell, Nike Cuts Ties with Manny Pacquiao] (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. “Political Correctness” has been defined in multiple ways. See 
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Political correctness has gained new momentum in the past 
few years, as the American public has become increasingly 
socially liberal. While a 1996 Gallup Poll found that just 27% of 
Americans felt that the government should recognize same-sex 
marriages, a 2016 poll found that number had risen to 61%.81  
But a rise in tolerance has also ushered a rise in sensitivity.82 
Society has become increasingly sensitive, with many now going 
so far as to recognize “microaggressions” as a new form of 
intolerance.83 One article noted that racial discrimination now 
often surfaces as microaggressions or “brief, every day, often 
unconsciously delivered exchanges that send denigrating 
messages to people of color because they belong to a racial 
minority group.”84 For example, a teacher telling a student of 
                                                                                                     
Politically Correct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015) 
(agreeing with the idea that people should be careful to not use language or 
behave in a way that could offend a particular group of people); see also Michael 
Kilian, Warning on Political Correctness: Endowment Head Sees Liberal 
McCarthyism on Campuses, CHICAGO TRIB. (July 31, 1991), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-07-31/news/9103240473_1_humanities-
endowment-chairman-lynne-cheney-liberal (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“The 
term ‘political correctness’ is used—especially by conservatives—to refer to a 
liberal orthodoxy that includes support for affirmative action programs, 
outlawing hate speech and downplaying European and male influence on 
Western civilization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 
James B. Clark, III, Political Correctness and the First Amendment: An 
Untenable Conflict, 8 NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 12, 12 (1994) 
Though difficult to define precisely, “political correctness” might 
accurately be described as a movement guided, indeed energized, by 
the tenet that the traditional Western/European culture and values 
are inherently oppressive and must be challenged at every 
opportunity in an effort to lift all of its victims from their traditionally 
oppressed state. 
 81. Marriage, GALLUP, INC., http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage. 
aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 82. See Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/ 
judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
(“[K]eeping college-level discussions ‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive, 
[but] it’s bad for them and for everyone else.”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 83. See Daniel Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial 
Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate at the University of California, 
Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 16 (2002) (explaining that “racial 
microaggressions” are a “subtle form of racism” that “causes stress”). 
 84. Adina B. Appelbaum, Challenging Crimmigration: Applying Padilla 
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foreign descent that she speaks English well could potentially 
make that student feel excluded, as the teacher’s underlying 
assumption is that English was not her first language.85 
On one hand, political correctness promotes empathy and 
equality for traditionally disenfranchised groups.86 In the words 
of one academic, “[w]e embrace the commitment to equity that 
underlies political correctness, and we applaud the shifts in 
norms wrought by that commitment.”87 Indeed, the vast majority 
of Americans would now likely agree that overt racism and 
sexism are unacceptable, and it is common to object to violators of 
these societal norms.88 This public shaming of discrimination and 
insensitivity has done a great deal for tolerance—or at least the 
appearance thereof—in the workplace, politics, and the 
entertainment industry, among other places.89 While many 
argue, likely correctly, that prejudice is still very much alive in 
American culture,90 something can be said for an era in which 
                                                                                                     
Negotiation Strategies Outside the Criminal Courtroom, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD. 
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 217, 241 (2014). 
 85. See Kathy Wyer, UCLA Ed Professors Carola Suárez-Orozco and 
Daniel Solorzano Share Insights on Subtle, Often Unintentional Slights on Race, 
Gender, Status, UCLA ED. & IS, (June 2, 2015), 
https://ampersand.gseis.ucla.edu/micro aggressions-what-you-need-to-know/ 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Oftentimes unconscious and automatic, 
microaggressions (MAs) are brief, subtle verbal or non-verbal exchanges that 
send denigrating messages to the recipient because of his or her group 
membership (such as race, gender, age or socio-economic status.”) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 86. See Paul Richard Kuehn, Is Political Correctness Good for Everyone?, 
HUBPAGES, http://hubpages.com/politics/Does-Being-Politically-Correct-Make-
Everyone-a-Winner (last updated Aug. 18, 2016) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
(detailing how, over the years, political correctness has manifested into “new 
politically correct words” that are used “in referring to ethnic groups, races, jobs, 
and people with disabilities”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 87. Robin J. Ely et al., Rethinking Political Correctness, 84 HARV. BUS. REV. 
79, 80 (2006). 
 88. See Mike LaBossiere, Ad Baculum, Racism & Sexism, TALKING 
PHILOSOPHY: THE PHILOSOPHERS’ MAG. BLOG (May 9, 2014), 
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=7932 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“[O]vert 
racism and sexism are regarded as unacceptable and those who make racist or 
sexist claims sometimes find themselves the object of public disapproval.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See id. (“In some cases, making such claims can cost a person his job.”). 
 90. See Clark, supra note 80, at 13 (stating that the political correctness 
movement embraces “simple-minded solutions to deep-rooted historical 
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people are encouraged to be tolerant of others—at least at the 
surface level. 
Still, the political correctness movement has more than its 
share of critics.91 The term political correctness itself is often said 
with a negative connotation, and it is frequently thought to refer 
to language that is not just tolerant but excessively inoffensive.92 
Critics of political correctness argue that simply using different 
words in everyday discourse does not solve the deep-rooted 
problems of marginalized groups.93 Additionally, these skeptics 
claim, perhaps accurately, that by publicly demonizing the 
politically incorrect, proponents of the movement leave little room 
for dissent.94 The political correctness movement has also been 
chastised as conflicting with the spirit of the First Amendment—
that optimal solutions are the result of free public debate and the 
uninhibited exchange of ideas.95 
                                                                                                     
problems”); Alicia Luke, Employment Discrimination Litigation: Social Science 
Evidence and a Solution for the Problem of Presumptions, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. 
& ENVTL. L. 75, 94 (2010) (“While it appears that discrimination is still alive and 
well, it often manifests in a more nuanced kind of discrimination than that 
which occurred during the Civil Rights Era.” (citing Reid v. Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 660 (N.D. Ga. 2001))). 
 91. See David Limbaugh, Political Correctness Doesn’t Only Threaten 
Speech, PEOPLE’S PUNDIT DAILY: INDEP. DATA JOURNALISM (Sept. 20, 2016), 
https://www.peoplespunditdaily.com/opinion/2016/09/20/political-correctness-
doesnt-threaten-speech-2/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (explaining that political 
correctness not only adversely affects free speech, but race relations on college 
campuses and the messages that it sends) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 92. See Jonathan Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY 
INTELLIGENCER/NAT’L INT. (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily 
/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
[hereinafter Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say] (discussing that individuals 
such as Bill Maher, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Condoleeza Rice were the subject of 
protests on college campuses based on their recently voiced opinions) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 93. See Clark, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing that some of the 
problems faced by marginalized groups are “poverty, lack of education and 
societal ignorance”). 
 94. Id. at 12. 
 95. See id. (saying that political correctness is a new “insidious” challenge 
to the First Amendment’s principles because “it has allied itself” with the First 
Amendment’s traditional friends: “the poor, the downtrodden and the 
different”). 
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Regardless of one’s personal philosophy on political 
sensitivity and correctness, it is inarguable that the movement is 
supported by a large and vocal portion of the American public and 
that refusal to conform can lead to serious economic 
consequences.96 Consider once-beloved A-list actor turned 
infamous anti-Semite Mel Gibson.97 In 2006, Gibson was arrested 
by a Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department Officer for driving under 
the influence of alcohol.98 During his arrest, a drunken, 
belligerent Gibson demanded to know whether the officer was 
Jewish and alleged that “the Jews are responsible for all the wars 
in the world.”99 That police report was made public, and Gibson 
has since landed very few movie roles and has struggled to escape 
the stigma related to those comments.100 Or recall former Los 
Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling, who was nationally 
scorned after a recording was made public in which he 
complained to his girlfriend that she spent too much time 
associating with black people.101 Sterling’s statements 
                                                                                                     
 96. See Conor Friedersdorf, Stripping a Professor of Tenure Over a Blog 
Post, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/ 
archive/2015/02/stripping-a-professor-of-tenure-over-a-blog-post/385280/ (last 
updated Feb. 10, 2015) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (discussing a Marquette 
professor that had his tenure terminated when he wrote a blog post pursuant to 
a discussion between a student and another professor regarding gay marriage) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 97. See Allison Hope Weiner, Mel Gibson Apologizes for Tirade After Arrest, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/us/30gibson.html 
(last updated Aug. 3, 2006) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (discussing Mel Gibson’s 
anti-Semitic remarks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
 100. See Ethan Sacks, Mel Gibson’s Career Never Recovered, 10 Years After 
Anti-Semitic Rant, DAILY NEWS: ENT. (July 26, 2016, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/mel-gibson-career-recovered-
anti-semitic-rant-article-1.2725688 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Thursday marks 
a decade since Gibson’s drunken rant . . . and his career still hasn’t recovered.”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 101. See Ben Golliver, NBA Investigating Clippers Owner Donald Sterling 
for Alleged Racist Comments, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 26, 2014), 
http://www.si.com/nba/point-forward/2014/04/26/donald-sterling-nba-investigation-
racist-comments-clippers (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Golliver, NBA 
Investigating Clippers] (noting that Donald Sterling stated to V. Stiviano that 
he did not want her to bring black people to the basketball games, including 
former basketball player Earvin “Magic” Johnson) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
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immediately became the center of attention for American news 
outlets, after which the National Basketball Association banned 
him for life.102 
In a society in which insensitivity and intolerance are the 
subjects of widespread public shaming, the individual perpetrator 
is not the only party affected.103 Associates of the politically 
incorrect often receive immense pressure to denounce the 
questionable behavior, or risk being perceived as condoning it.104 
To avoid such guilt by association, companies are quick to 
distance themselves from employees or corporate partners that 
become the center of such scrutiny.105 For example, in 2013, 
celebrity chef Paula Deen lost a book deal as well as a contract 
with the Food Network after admitting in a deposition that she 
had used racist language and had tolerated racial jokes in the 
past.106 
                                                                                                     
 102. Dan Hirschhorn, NBA Bans Donald Sterling ‘For Life’ After Racist 
Rant, TIME (Apr. 29, 2014), http://time.com/81170/donald-sterling-los-angeles-
clippers-nba-adam-silver/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 103. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 352 (“The underlying purpose of a morals clause . . . is to protect the 
contracting company from the immoral behavior of the talent with whom it 
contracts.” (citing Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent 
Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 
235 (2005))). 
 104. See Ten Athletes Who Lost Their Endorsements, FOX SPORTS (Feb. 19, 
2016, 2:07 AM), http://www.foxsportsasia.com/news/ten-athletes-lost-endorse 
ments/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (discussing Michael Phelps’s lost 
endorsements when a video emerged on the internet of him smoking marijuana) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 105. See John Santucci, The Companies that Have Dumped Donald Trump, 
ABC NEWS (July 4, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/companies-
dumped-donald-trump/story?id=32162703 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (providing 
that that companies such as Univision, NBC Universal, Macy’s, and others 
separated ties with Trump when he made comments about Mexico during the 
announcement of his running for President) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 106. Katie Rogers, Paula Deen Faces Backlash Over ‘I Love Lucy’ Posting, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nytnow/paula-
deen-faces-backlash-over-i-love-lucy-posting.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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2. The Role of the Internet and Social Media 
In addition to the public’s increased scrutiny of controversial 
statements, through the rise of social media, such statements 
now reach larger audiences than ever, and they are doing so 
much faster.107 This is true not only for celebrities but for the 
general public as well.108 In the third quarter of 2016, Facebook 
alone had over 1.79 billion active users worldwide, continuing a 
decade-long upward trend.109 Although online connections often 
“reflect pre-existing offline connections, social media also brings 
together strangers with similar hobbies, interests, and political 
views.”110 
Consequently, individuals’ comments, photos, videos, and 
other actions on social media can often reach broad, unintended 
audiences.111 Information on Facebook, for instance, is public by 
default unless the user manually increases his or her security 
settings.112 Thus, a common person’s  well-timed Facebook or 
Twitter comment can be seen by millions of people around the 
world.113 In fact, the Facebook post that received the most 
                                                                                                     
 107. See Doug Cross, 5 Ways Twitter Changed How We Communicate, CNN 
(Mar. 21, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/social.media/03/21/ 
twitter.birthday.communication/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (discussing how 
Twitter removed the celebrity filter and made the flow of information faster, 
among other things) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 108. See id. (claiming that if it was not for Twitter, little known bloggers, 
journalists, and podcasters would not have as big an audience). 
 109. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 
2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-
of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 110. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the 
First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2012). 
 111. Id. at 1607 (citing Lance Ulanoff, Your Digital Debris Is Haunting You, 
PC MAG. (June 9, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386635,00.asp 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 112. Id. at 1608–09 (citing Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: 
A Timeline, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www. 
eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)). 
 113. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 
2010/04/facebook-timeline (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (arguing that Facebook’s 
growth came from communicating with a group of your choice to “where much of 
your information is public” and that there is always going to be a certain 
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interaction in 2015 was not that of any celebrity at all, but a 
photo of a child holding a sign reading: “Can I get 1 million likes? 
I BEAT CANCER.”114 The photo received over 10 million likes, as 
well as thousands of shares and comments.115 
While there is no shortage of positive, heartfelt energy on 
social media, more negative or risqué activity often receives a 
great deal of attention as well—causing trouble for employees of 
all levels. For example, a part-time stadium guard for the 
Philadelphia Eagles dispatched the following tweet after the 
team let safety Brian Dawkins sign with the Denver Broncos in 
2009: “Dan is [expletive] devastated about Dawkins signing with 
Denver . . . . Dam Eagles R Retarded!!”116 He was terminated 
nearly immediately after his employer was informed of the 
offensive and politically incorrect comment.117 This employee is 
just one of many disciplined for posting what their employers 
considered inappropriate content on social media.118 Some 
businesses have even gone so far as to conduct social media 
background checks through third-party companies, which scour 
the internet for, among other things, “online evidence of racist 
remarks.”119 Before the advent of social media, such activities 
would likely have remained among friends and family and would 
                                                                                                     
amount of information that is public) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 114. Tessa Berenson, These Are the Top Facebook Posts of 2015, TIME (Dec. 
31, 2015), http://time.com/4164895/top-facebook-posts-2015/ (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 115. Id. 
 116. Facebook Post Gets Worker Fired, ESPN (Mar. 9, 2009), 
http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3965039 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 117. See id. (noting that the employee was fired merely days after his 
comment). 
 118. See Papandrea, supra note 110, at 1604 (explaining that teachers in 
public schools can face severe punishments if they use social media in a way 
that is “otherwise inappropriate or unprofessional”). 
 119. Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/ 
social-media-history-becomes-a-new-job-hurdle.html?_r=0 (last updated July 25, 
2011) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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have never have come to the attention of employers, much less 
the general public.120 
Social media can be particularly risky for users because 
through features such as “liking,” “sharing,” and “retweeting,” 
one can be connected to statements he or she did not even 
make.121 For instance, in April 2016, former MLB All-Star pitcher 
and ESPN baseball analyst, Curt Schilling, was terminated by 
ESPN—likely pursuant to a morality clause—after he shared an 
arguably transphobic photo on Facebook.122 Schilling later 
defended his comments by arguing that he did not post the photo 
himself but merely shared it.123 Nonetheless, the ability to be so 
clearly tied to the speech or actions of another person forces social 
media users to be thoughtful and defensive in all of their online 
activity. 
The permanence of the internet further increases the 
potential for negative attention.124 While in-person comments 
                                                                                                     
 120. See Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares: Cyberspeak No Evil, 
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 
2017) (“Thanks to Facebook . . . what used to be private is now very public.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 121. See James Parsons, What Exactly Does Liking a Tweet Do on Twitter?, 
FOLLOWS.COM (Jan. 23, 2016), http://follows.com/blog/2016/01/tweet-likes-twitter 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (stating that liking tweets can be a bookmarking tool, 
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automatic support) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See Richard Sanomir, Curt Schilling, ESPN Analyst, Is Fired Over 
Offensive Social Media Post, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2016), 
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[hereinafter Sanomir, Curt Schilling] (“Schilling . . . was dismissed after sharing 
a Facebook post . . . that appeared to respond to the North Carolina law that 
bars transgender people from using bathrooms . . . .”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 123. See Andrew Joseph, Curt Schilling Defends His Anti-Transgender 
Facebook Post: ‘I Didn’t Post That Ugly Looking Picture’, USA TODAY SPORTS 
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/04/curt-schilling-anti-transgender-
face book-post-denies-defends-post-espn-mlb (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) 
(“Schilling may not have been the original poster of the meme—he technically 
shared it. But he still posted and endorsed the message it promoted.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 124. See Linda Criddle, What Teens Should Know About Online Reputations, 
WEBROOT, https://www.webroot.com/us/en/home/resources/tips/managing-your-
online-reputation/reputation-what-teens-should-know-about-online-reputations 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Each drop of information is collected into personal 
virtual buckets. The information rarely disappears; instead, it accumulates, 
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may be forgotten or explained away, Tweets can be analyzed 
word-for-word and clearly displayed for the public long after they 
are written, and often with little context.125 Online activity can be 
saved by others even if the original commenter later deletes a 
post.126 This concrete evidence of one’s actions adds yet another 
layer of concern. 
It is worth noting that in addition to social media, other 
technological advances have made the public’s actions subject to 
higher scrutiny than ever before.127 For one, the ubiquity of 
smartphones equips nearly everyone with a camera as well as a 
high-quality recording device.128 This caused the fall from grace 
of former Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling, discussed 
above, whose ex-girlfriend secretly recorded his racist comments 
on her cellphone.129 Moreover, the low prices of cameras in 
general have ensured that a high percentage of our seemingly 
private actions are memorialized.130 This was a hard lesson for 
former NFL running back Ray Rice, who was caught hitting his 
                                                                                                     
slowly building a comprehensive picture of your identities and lives.”) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 125. See id. (“Shedding an earlier image to move in new directions can be 
harder in a digitally recorded world as your previous postings may make it 
difficult.”). 
 126. See id. (“Comments, actions, or images once posted online may stay 
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 127. See Mike Laurie, 7 Technologies Shaping the Future of Social Media, 
MASHABLE (June 01, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/06/01/social-media-future-
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 128. See The Impact of Technology on Your Social Media, DIGITALSOLUTIONS, 
http://ds6.net/the-impact-of-technology-on-your-social-media/ (last visited Mar. 
4, 2017) (comparing an iPhone with an eight megapixel camera to a Nokia 
Lumia 1020 that boasts a forty-one megapixel camera) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 129. See Golliver, supra note 101 (detailing how Donald Sterling did not 
want his ex-girlfriend to associate with black people and bring them to the 
basketball games).  
 130. See Tom de Castella, Five Ways the Digital Camera Changed Us, BBC 
(Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-16483509 (last visited Mar. 
4, 2017) (explaining that the advent of the smartphone “brought digital 
photography to the masses” and allowed people to take large numbers of 
pictures at “almost no consequence or cost”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
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fiancée by an elevator security camera.131 Rice subsequently lost 
an endorsement deal with sports equipment company 
Vertimax.132 
3. Businesses’ Increased Political and Values-Based Engagement 
Increasingly, companies are involved in political speech and 
expressing specific values of their own.133 They are highly 
engaged in the political process and have a constitutionally 
protected right to their corporate identities.134 Like members of 
the general public, they can be conservative or liberal, religious or 
secular. Naturally then, those companies seek employees and 
partners that will fall in line with those views and values and 
want to be able to cut ties with those who contradict them.135 
Unlike the political correctness movement, which is 
consistently socially liberal,136 businesses fall all over the 
                                                                                                     
 131. See Daniel Roberts & Benjamin Snyder, Ray Rice and 11 Other Athletes 
Who Lost Their Endorsements, FORTUNE (Sept. 20, 2014), 
http://fortune.com/2014/09/20/ray-rice-adrian-peterson-tiger-woods-athletes-drop 
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 132. Id. 
 133. See Leighton Walter Kille, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment: 
History, Data and Implications, JOURNALIST’S RESOURCE, 
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 134. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010) 
(finding unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited independent corporate 
expenditures for electioneering). 
 135. See Will Staney, How to Hire People Who Fit a Company’s Culture, 
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236975 
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Hiring employees who understand and exemplify 
company values serves to reinforce the organization’s mission and vision . . . .”) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 136. See Amanda Hess, How ‘Political Correctness’ Went from Punch Line to 
Panic, N.Y. TIMES, (July 19, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/ 
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spectrum with regard to social issues.137 One particularly 
well-known example is fast-food chain Chick-fil-A, which has 
long been known for its conservative leanings and traditional 
stance on marriage—although the company has recently 
strived to soften its appearance.138 Similarly, in 2014, arts and 
crafts retailer Hobby Lobby went to the United States Supreme 
Court to defend its refusal to provide contraceptives to 
employees in accordance with the company’s religious 
beliefs.139 Being that most morality clauses are broad and 
subject to significant interpretation,140 socially conservative 
organizations such as these might use such a clause to break 
ties with the maker of socially progressive speech.141 
Meanwhile, a company with opposing views could use an 
identical clause to distance itself from a speaker advocating for 
traditional marriage laws or some similarly right-wing 
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(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing the political correctness movement as a 
“shorthand for liberal politics”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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Issues, ENTREPRENEUR, (Apr. 20, 2016) https://www.entrepreneur.com/article 
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the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
story/money/business/2014/04/07/chick-fil-a-fast-food-dan-cathy/7250871/ (last 
updated Apr. 8, 2017, 2:53 PM) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“It wants to go from 
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Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 139. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014) 
(finding by a five-to-four majority that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
allows a for-profit employer to deny employees contraceptives to which they 
would otherwise be entitled under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act of 2010 based on religious convictions). 
 140. See Matthew Philips, Morals Clauses and Ms. Spears, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 
19, 2007, 7:00 PM) http://www.newsweek.com/morals-clauses-and-ms-spears-
94295 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (indicating that morality clauses “usually fall 
along the vague lines”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 141. See MICHAEL P. ZWEIG, 11 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN 
FEDERAL COURTS §126:46 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that a morality clause “typically 
gives the employer the right to terminate the contract or otherwise sanction the 
[employee] if the individual behaves in a way that . . . damages the image of the 
employer by association”).  
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position. On Valentine’s Day 2016, sportswear brand Adidas 
shared a photo on social media featuring two woman wearing 
Adidas shoes with the caption, “The love you take is equal to 
the love you make.”142 Adidas is thus one of many American 
companies that have taken a stand in favor of sexual 
orientation equality.143 As discussed, Nike recently broke ties 
with Manny Pacquiao over his comments against same-sex 
couples,144 and Adidas would likely use a morality clause in the 
same way. 
Regardless of the political position or values that a 
company adopts, such a company is highly motivated to act in 
accordance with that position and would want the power to do 
so in a contractual relationship.145 In sum, the resurgence of 
political correctness,146 the advent of social media,147 and the 
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AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/adidas-valentines-day-ad-same-sex-
couple_us_56c56250e4b08ffac127b0eb (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“After 
attracting controversy for an ad featuring a same-sex couple, Adidas responded 
to haters with an unequivocal message: Love is love.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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(reporting that Nike terminated its endorsement contract with Manny Pacquiao 
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escalation of company values148 have all fueled the popularity 
of the morality clause. 
III. Legal and Policy Challenges to Morality Clauses 
Since the days of Blackstone,149 the cornerstone of contract 
law is that a competent person may make her own bargain.150 
Under common law, “[t]he general rule is that competent 
persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that 
their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held 
valid and enforced in the courts.”151 Thus, freedom of contract 
doctrine provides people with the ability to bargain away 
rights to which they would otherwise be entitled.152 
However, the freedom of contract has its limitations.153 The 
Restatement provides that some agreements are unenforceable 
to ensure elemental fairness, protect weaker parties, and 
secure social order.154 Contracts lacking in mutual assent or 
consideration are void.155 Agreements are unenforceable when 
either party lacks capacity,156 they are tinged with 
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Success, BUS. NEWS DAILY (May 31, 2013, 10:35 AM), 
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 152. See Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement, 
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 154. See id. § 178(1) (setting forth that a term of a contract will be 
unenforceable on public policy grounds if the legislator so chooses or enforcing 
the contract is “clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy”).  
 155. Id. § 17. 
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unconscionability157 or illegality,158 and when the contract is 
against public policy.159 
Non-competes are one such example.160 For reasons of public 
policy, the law limits the enforceability of covenants not to 
compete,161 in which an often-weaker party agrees not to 
participate in a competing business at the end of a business 
relationship.162 When not entirely prohibited by law,163 
non-compete agreements are enforceable only if the restrictions 
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the 
employer.164 A restrictive covenant must also: (1) provide a 
reasonable time limit; (2) provide a reasonable territorial limit; 
(3) not be too harsh or oppressive on the employee; and (4) not be 
contrary to public policy.165 
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Courts have traditionally analyzed non-competes closely 
along these analytical lines because of their effects on employee 
mobility and freedom.166 Where they were initially designed for 
high-level employees and company founders, businesses have 
broadened their reach to lower-level, low-wage, and entry-level 
employees,167 including sandwich-makers,168 hairstylists,169 
sanitation workers,170 and camp counselors.171 This expansion 
                                                                                                     
 166. See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment. Post-Employment Restraint 
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 168. A 2014 press report found that sandwich chain Jimmy John’s required 
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New York. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen. (June 22, 
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Samantha 
Bomkamp, Illinois AG Sues Jimmy John’s Over Noncompete Pacts; Chain 
‘Disappointed’, CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.chicago 
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html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (observing that Illinois’s Attorney General also 
filed suit against Jimmy John’s for the same reason) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 169. See King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So.2d 769, 772 
(Ala. 2004) (finding that a “noncompetition agreement prohibiting King from 
working in the hair-care industry within a two-mile radius of any of Head 
Start’s 30 locations is unduly burdensome”). 
 170. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 
2006) (concluding that the district court properly held that a non-compete 
agreement against a sanitation worker was overly broad and unenforceable). 
 171. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in 
Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-of-
jobs.html?smid=pl-share (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (reporting that Colette 
Buser, a summer camp counselor, signed a non-compete agreement that forbade 
her from working at a competing camp within ten miles) (on file with the 
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has caught the critical eyes of both state and federal legislatures, 
and the White House, which has advocated for their further 
restriction on public policy grounds.172 
In fact, morality clauses have much in common with 
non-competes: they are often tangential to personal services 
contracts;173 they purport to protect the stronger party’s business 
interests;174 they restrain the subject’s rights;175 they can be 
aggressively broad and lacking in consideration;176 and they may 
sometimes be imposed in inherently-coercive settings.177 Like 
non-competes, morality clauses have experienced a 
democratization as of late.178 
However, unlike non-competes, morality clauses have thus 
far escaped judicial scrutiny. They have not been the subject of 
strict inquiry on legal or public policy grounds. In fact, other than 
in the celebrity context,179 they have been largely ignored. In 
                                                                                                     
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 172. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE 
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agreements). 
 173. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 353 (pointing out that morality clauses in talent contracts have been 
around since the 1920s). 
 174. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 235 (“[T]he 
‘morals clause’ generally allows buyers, such as advertisers, to terminate a 
talent agreement when an actor’s conduct is detrimental to the buyer’s interests 
or otherwise devalues the performance due.”). 
 175. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 350 (“As a general proposition, talent needs to know that a morals clause is 
powerful enough to impact important aspects of one’s career, ranging from one’s 
compensation and continued employment to restrictions upon his or her 
personal behavior.”). 
 176. See id. at 371 (describing how companies will try to include 
broadly-worded morals clauses).  
 177. See Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 AKRON 
L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2016) [hereinafter Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private 
Law] (contending that some employees that care about the restrictions imposed 
by morality clauses still sign the employment contract because they need the 
job). 
 178. See Taylor, III. et al., The Reverse Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 79–
80 (presenting the birth of the reverse-morals clause, which allows a celebrity to 
bow out of a deal if the company engages in certain type of immoral behavior). 
 179.  See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 357–62 (examining seminal cases involving morality clauses and 
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light of the increasing breadth and use of morality clauses across 
many ranks,180 the time is right to examine these restraints 
closely, taking into account their potential legal failings and 
adverse consequences on public policy grounds. 
A. Mutual Assent and Definiteness 
The law requires contractual terms to be reasonably certain 
and definite.181 That is, they must supply “a basis for determining 
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate 
remedy.”182 This principle does not require absolute certainty; 
rather, only the quantum that is “reasonable” under the 
circumstances.183 In general, ambiguous language will be 
interpreted in favor of the non-drafting party.184 
Typically, both Bad Behavior and Reputational Impact 
morality clauses are broad, indefinite, and at worst, 
tautological.185 A Bad Behavior clause might ban acts that just 
generally offend notions of “decency” and “morality.”186 Some 
Reputational Impact clauses may be so indefinite as to be 
illusory, effectively prohibiting any conduct that the enforcing 
party deems to be unacceptable or potentially tarnishing.187 Most 
                                                                                                     
celebrities).  
 180. See DePillis, supra note 167 (reporting on the rise of morality clauses in 
all areas of employment).  
 181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
 182. Id. § 33(2). 
 183. See id. § 33 cmt. a (explaining that for a contract to be enforceable the 
terms of the contract need not be definitively certain). 
 184. See Raymond H. Srp, Survey of Ohio Law: 2011 Supreme Court of Ohio 
Decisions: II. Contract Interpretation: A. Insurance Policies: Westfield Insurance 
Co. v. Hunter, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1211, 1223 (2012) (“Both courts simply 
interpreted an ambiguity in a contract by construing the language against the 
drafting party.”). 
 185. See Philips, supra note 140 (observing morality clauses as “usually 
fall[ing] along vague lines of not doing anything that might bring about public 
disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or reflecting unfavorably on” the 
company). 
 186. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 201–12 (pointing out that 
the earliest morals clauses “contained triggers defined by notices of ‘decency’ 
and ‘morality’” (citations omitted)).  
 187. See id. at 213–18 (mentioning that disrepute triggers in morality 
clauses give companies great latitude in determining when a morals clause is 
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contracts do not define these vague terms, choosing to adopt 
Justice Stewart’s “I-know-it-when-I see-it” standard.188 By their 
very nature, these concepts—and the behavior they ban—are 
indistinct.189 In practice, these concepts are relative to time, 
place, and historical moment—often dependent on the code of 
conduct currently acceptable to society.190 
Despite the obvious ambiguity and breadth of the actions 
conceivably covered by a ban on generally immoral or even “bad” 
behavior, courts have upheld even the most ambiguous morality 
clauses.191 In Knox-Pipes v. Genesee Intermediate School 
District,192 the plaintiff, who was terminated for conduct 
involving moral turpitude, argued that because the term was not 
defined, no legal obligation was created.193 The court rejected the 
argument, concluding that the dictionary definition of the term 
could be used to ascertain the word’s plain and ordinary 
meaning.194 Similarly, in Nader v. ABC TV, Inc.,195 ABC 
terminated a soap opera star’s contract pursuant to a morality 
clause after he was arrested for selling cocaine to an undercover 
police officer.196 The morality clause at issue disallowed any 
conduct that “might tend to reflect unfavorably on ABC” or any of 
its sponsors, licensees, series, or programs.197 In a breach of 
                                                                                                     
breached). 
 188. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring) (defining “I know it when I see it” as the threshold test when 
determining whether a motion picture is obscene under an Ohio statute that 
convicted people for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film). 
 189. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 352 (“By their very nature, morals are subjective concepts . . . .”). 
 190. See id. (declaring that “[a]t the very least, moral behavior refers to 
behavior that comports to an existing code of conduct put forward by society”). 
 191. See Nader v. ABC TV, Inc., 150 F. App’x. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(pronouncing that ABC could fire the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s claim that 
ABC’s morality clause was unenforceable because of vagueness was not 
supported). 
 192. No. 322295, 2015 WL 5657396 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2015), appeal 
denied, 499 Mich. 915 (2016). 
 193. Id. at *8. 
 194. Id. 
 195. 330 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x. 54 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
 196. Nader,150 F. App’x. at 55. 
 197. Id. at 54.  
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contract claim for wrongful termination, Nader argued that the 
clause was “too ambiguous or vague,” and that his actions did not 
fall within its confines.198 The Second Circuit rejected this 
argument and, in affirming the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment, held that Nader’s arrest and the resulting media 
attention brought his conduct “well within any reasonable 
interpretation of the [morality] clause.”199 
Despite these examples, it is undisputed that a party needs 
to know (either implicitly or expressly) what behavior or conduct 
will trigger termination under a morality clause.200 In Dias v. 
Archdiocese of Cincinnati,201 a Catholic school fired its technology 
coordinator for becoming pregnant through artificial 
insemination.202 The morality clause in her contract required the 
employee to abide by Catholic doctrine,203 even though she was a 
non-ministerial employee.204 In her suit for breach of contract, the 
plaintiff claimed the morality clause was invalid and illegal 
because it was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination.205 The 
court found that the contract lacked a “meeting of the minds” 
because the clause did not address artificial insemination, and 
there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff knew she 
was barred from such action.206 
                                                                                                     
 198. Id. at 56.  
 199. Id. 
 200. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 369–79 (discussing what talent needs to know about morality clauses). 
 201. No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012). 
 202. Id. at *1. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at *8. 
 205. Id. at *2. 
 206. Id. at *6. But see Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251, 
2013 WL 360355, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (“Such clause stated 
generally that Plaintiff would ‘comply with and act consistently in accordance 
with the stated philosophy and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.’”). In 
addressing the parties’ subsequent cross motions for summary judgment, the 
court did not address the plaintiff’s contract claim because it found she had 
unclean hands. Although she did not know artificial insemination was 
prohibited, she did know that homosexuality was, and she testified to keeping 
her long-term homosexual relationship secret because she knew it was a breach 
of her contract. See id. at *14 (determining the plaintiff knew this would be a 
violation of the morals clause).  
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Nonetheless, there is no shortage of highly ambiguous 
morality clauses between employers and employees of all 
levels.207 Although the majority of employee contracts are not 
publicly available, some published employee handbooks give 
guidance as to the stances employers are taking.208 In some 
situations, courts have recognized these manuals as implied 
contracts, which are binding upon employers.209 Los Angeles 
County, California, which employs over 100,000 people,210 has 
included the following clause in its employee handbook: “The rule 
is simple, we are accountable for what we do—we do not engage 
in any behavior that would compromise the County, or be an 
embarrassment to the County.”211 In a particularly outstanding 
morality clause, Lee University requires all of its administration 
and staff to “mirror a Christ-like example for students on a daily 
basis,” while refraining from “homosexual practices and other 
forms of sexual behavior which violate Scripture.”212 Schools, 
universities, religious institutions, and other non-profit 
organizations all regularly include morality provisions in 
                                                                                                     
 207. See supra notes 167–171, 191 (highlighting that low-level employees 
and actors both sign contracts that contain morality clauses). 
 208. See Mike the Inkman, Hobby Lobby Adds ‘Abstinence Policy’ To 
Employee Handbooks, EMPIRE NEWS, http://empirenews.net/hobby-lobby-adds-
abstinence-policy-to-employee-handbooks/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Hobby 
Lobby . . . announced that they are adding new rule to their ‘Employee Code of 
Conduct,’ which will now include a passage that says the company expects all of 
their non-married workers to practice abstinence.”) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 209.  See Rachel Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee 
Handbooks: The Creation of a Common Law Information-Eliciting Penalty 
Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 701 (2005) [hereinafter Levy, Judicial 
Interpretation] (“Beginning in the early 1980s, however, virtually every state 
supreme court reconsidered its treatment of employee handbooks and concluded 
that under the right conditions a handbook could be transformed into a 
unilateral contract.”). 
 210. LA County Employees, CTY. OF L.A. http://portal.lacounty. 
gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/b0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOItDCDAyMIk0M3
AyMfVItTT1NjIINRAvyDbUREACWv94w!!/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 211. CTY. OF LOS ANGELES, EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 24 (2003), 
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/113484_Employee_Handbook.pdf. 
 212. LEE UNIVERSITY, ADMINISTRATIVE/SUPPORT STAFF HANDBOOK 14 (2015), 
https://www.leeuniversity.edu/uploadedFiles/Content/human-resources/staff-hand 
book.pdf. 
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employment contracts.213 Clauses like these give an employer 
tremendous discretion in determining whether an employee’s 
conduct was “Christ-like” or “embarrassing.”214 
B. Subjective Enforcement and Bad Faith 
The question of whether a morality clause correctly triggers 
termination is one of fact, premised upon the clause’s language 
and whether the allegedly offending behavior falls within its 
ambit.215 As discussed above, the breadth of morality clauses 
encompasses wide-ranging behaviors that are often ill-defined.216 
Given the inherent ambiguity, how can courts distinguish 
exacting, and perhaps prudish, enforcers from those using 
morality clauses as a pretext to act in bad faith? 
With Bad Behavior clauses, courts have the unenviable task 
of assessing whether the behavior is normatively offensive 
enough to the community to trigger a contractual discharge.217 
Courts commonly make these fact-intensive assessments in other 
areas of law, such as obscenity,218 privacy,219 and tort law 
                                                                                                     
 213. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, supra note 177, at 57. 
 214. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 202 (“Given the vast 
universe of conduct this definition [of morality] might encompass, non-talent 
had exceedingly broad latitude to determine when talent’s conduct failed to 
meet the standard set by the contemporaneous society.”). 
 215. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 245 
(“Determining whether an express morals clause is breached is a question of fact 
dependent upon the wording of the morals clause and the conduct at issue.”). 
 216. See supra notes 185–190 and accompanying text (defining types of 
morality clauses and the broad conduct they seek to regulate). 
 217. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 246 
(highlighting that under California and New York law, a breach of an express 
morals clause is proper when an “actor’s conduct is viewed by a large segment of 
the public as shocking, insulting or offensive”). 
 218. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (“We are told that the 
determination whether a particular motion picture, book, or other work of 
expression is obscene can be treated as a purely factual judgment on which a 
jury’s verdict is all but conclusive . . . .”). 
 219. See JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER & HELEN 
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 9 (2014) (clarifying that 
privacy law in the realm of intrusion upon seclusion and the public disclosure of 
private facts is a factual determination based on the activities of “both subjects 
and acquirers of personal information”).  
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(emotional distress cases).220 In the case of Reputational Impact 
clauses, the assessment of a breach often depends on public 
perception and awareness, which is less subjective but no less 
slippery a concept.221 
For instance, in the 2012 case of Mendenhall v. 
Hanesbrands,222 a North Carolina district court had to determine 
if an athlete’s tweets plausibly caused sufficient uproar to cancel 
an endorsement deal.223 There, former Pittsburg Steelers running 
back Rashard Mendenhall entered into an agreement with 
clothing manufacturer Hanesbrands, Inc., in which he promised 
to promote the company’s athletic apparel branded Champion 
Apparel.224 The agreement included the following clause: 
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any crime or becomes 
involved in any situation or occurrence . . . tending to bring 
Mendenhall into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or 
ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the majority of 
the consuming public or any protected class or group thereof, 
then [Hanes] shall have the right to immediately terminate 
this Agreement.225 
Mendenhall was an active user of the social media platform, 
Twitter, where he commonly expressed views on many issues 
ranging from Islam to parenting.226 At one point he even 
compared the NFL to the slave trade.227 Hanesbrands never 
commented on Mendenhall’s tweets, nor did it ask him to limit 
his controversial comments.228 When President Barack Obama 
announced the death of Osama bin Laden, Mendenhall posted 
                                                                                                     
 220. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 
1741 (1985) (discussing that causation in tort law is a factual inquiry). 
 221. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 214–15 (“The Court of 
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) . . . has defined bringing a person into disrepute as 
lowering the reputation of the person in the eyes of ordinary members of the 
public to a significant extent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 222. 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012). 
 223. See id. at 727–28 (denying Hanesbrands’ motion for summary judgment 
and finding that there was a dispute of facts that existed between the parties to 
the public’s response to Mendenhall’s tweets). 
 224. Id. at 719. 
 225. Id. at 720. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id.  
 228. Id.  
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various comments on Twitter.229 One such tweet read, “What 
kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people can 
HATE a man they never even heard speak. We’ve only heard one 
side.”230 
Within two weeks, Hanes terminated Mendenhall’s 
agreement pursuant to the morality clause and issued a 
statement on ESPN that it did not agree with his controversial, 
but legitimately-held, beliefs.231 
Mendenhall brought a claim for breach of contract, and 
Hanes later moved for judgment on the pleadings.232 Interpreting 
the clause narrowly, the court concluded that Mendenhall could 
be terminated only if he created a public scandal, as specified by 
the agreement.233 Because the pleadings alone did not establish 
any actual scandal and even included facts suggesting that the 
comments garnered some positive responses, the court denied 
Hanes’s motion.234 However, in ruling as such, the court simply 
found that discovery was necessary to determine whether Hanes 
could prove that Mendenhall’s statements did create a scandal.235 
The parties settled prior to any further ruling.236 
If employers and other contracting parties are given 
unlimited discretion to interpret broad, all-encompassing morals 
clauses, they could quite easily use these clauses to terminate an 
economically disappointing relationship under the pretense of 
moral objection. Consider a situation in which a company enters 
into a two-year contract with an independent marketing 
consultant, hoping for a large increase in profits. Therein, the 
consultant agrees to a broad morality clause prohibiting, among 
other things, “all behavior likely to offend the company’s 
                                                                                                     
 229. Id. at 720–21. 
 230. Id. at 721. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. at 719. 
 233. Id. at 726. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Id. at 727–28. 
 236. Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall Settles Lawsuit with 
Hanesbrands Over Morals Clause, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:02 PM) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/01/17/rashard-mendenhall-settles-
lawsuit-with-hanesbrands-over-morals-clause/#16a1021c6c87 (last visited Mar. 
4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) 
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customers.” Although the consultant performs as promised, after 
six months, the company realizes that returns have been modest. 
The company subsequently discovers that the consultant recently 
made an insensitive comment regarding affirmative action on an 
online political forum. Should the retailer now be entitled to 
terminate the agreement? And should the law permit contract 
language that is so clearly ripe for abuse? That is, with such 
unlimited discretion to terminate an agreement, has the 
contracting party really bound itself to anything at all? Situations 
like these illustrate the lack of predictability surrounding the 
broadly-drafted morality clauses seen in so many modern 
agreements.237 In this way, such clauses essentially grant a blank 
check for abuse by the imposing party.238 
C. Concerns of Free Speech and Expression 
Broad morality clauses chill speech and free expression,239 
particularly when applied expansively through all levels of 
employees and corporate partners. And these repercussions could 
be significant.240 If all of the Fortune 500 companies were to bind 
their employees and agents to morality clauses, the speech and 
behavior of over 17% of the nation’s workforce would be 
constrained and controlled.241 At first blush, forcing almost a fifth 
                                                                                                     
 237. See supra notes 167–171, 191 and accompanying text (observing the 
growing trend of morality clauses in employment contracts). 
 238. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text (contending that broad 
morality clauses give employers the right to unilaterally terminate an 
employment contract). 
 239. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred 
Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49 
AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 90 (2012) (“Employer restrictions on off-duty speech and 
conduct are troubling in that they squelch expression and individual autonomy 
and may compromise the employee’s right to a private life . . . .”). 
 240. See Marka B. Fleming, Amanda Harmon Cooley & Gwendolyn 
McFadden-Wade, Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and Postsecondary 
Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 BYU EDUC. & 
L.J. 67, 67–68 (noting that discipline for violation of a morality clause by a 
teacher can result in suspension or revocation of a teaching certificate).  
 241. Claire Zillman & Stacy Jones, 7 Fortune 500 Companies with the Most 
Employees, FORTUNE (June 13, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/13/ 
fortune-500-most-employees/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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of the country to behave in accordance with the prevailing social 
norms would not be harmful. However, the consequences can be 
ill and far-reaching. 
If the clauses used in the hypothetical were Bad Behavior 
clauses, 17% of American workers would then be required to keep 
both their on and off-duty actions in line with the undefined and 
ever-changing public morals and social norms.242 A large portion 
of the populous would thus be held to perpetual, innocuous 
boardroom behavior. The result would be widespread uniformity 
and a significant reduction of free expression and challenges to 
the status quo. Similarly, if those same businesses imposed 
Reputational Impact clauses, employees would all need to refrain 
from offending the community at large.243 One could therefore 
expect the same result under either clause, both of which would 
essentially serve as a ban on unpopular speech.244 
To be clear, most American workers are employed on an 
at-will basis outside of any express contract.245 The at-will 
doctrine relies on the assumption that absent a contract 
specifically stating otherwise, an employment relationship is 
mutually consensual, and an employee may resign or be 
terminated at any time for any or no reason without liability to 
either party, unless an enumerated statutory or judicially-created 
exception applies.246 Courts have long examined cases in which 
                                                                                                     
 242. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
3, at 352 (arguing that morality clauses are largely governed by the prevailing 
societal values at the time).  
 243. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 213–19 (discussing how 
Reputational Impact morality clauses usually ban conduct by an employee that 
brings disrepute as perceived in the public eye to a company). 
 244. See Fleming, Cooley & McFadden-Wade, supra note 240, at 89 
(specifying that the freedom of speech is implicated in cases enforcing morals 
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 245. See The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-
employment-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Employment 
relationships are presumed to be ‘at-will’ in all U.S. states except Montana.”) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 246. See Stanley J. Brown & Henry Morris, Jr., Employment at Will, 10 
DISTRICT LAW. 42, 42 (1985) (mentioning that “[u]nder the traditional 
‘employment-at-will’ doctrine, employers had an absolute right to terminate 
their employees absent violation of a statute” and further noting that many 
state courts have recently found exceptions to the “at-will” rule). 
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at-will employees seek relief for termination based on their 
speech, and those courts have generally found that free speech 
protection is guaranteed only from government and not private 
employers.247 With regard to employees under contract, however, 
a morality clause should not serve as a “get out of jail free card,” 
turning a contractual relationship into at-will employment248 and 
here, courts should consider how the unfettered use of broad 
morality clauses can significantly chill free expression. 
Admittedly, some states do already impose some limits on 
how much an employer can intrude on the off-duty actions of an 
employee.249 For instance, sixteen states and the District of 
Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting employers from 
punishing employees for off-duty tobacco use.250 Meanwhile, eight 
states protect employees’ use of any legal products, and four 
states protect all legal off-duty activities.251 However, these latter 
                                                                                                     
 247. See Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Cmty. Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102, 1110 
(6th Cir. 1980) (applying Kentucky law to dismiss employee’s claims against 
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N.E.2d 370, 372–73 (Mass. 1991) (concluding that an employee’s free speech 
rights did not protect him from discharge when he spoke out against his 
company’s economic interests); Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 850 P.2d 
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But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898–99 (3d Cir. 1983) 
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Amendment). 
 248. Even with regard to at-will employees, an employer may be bound to 
the terms of a morality clause included in an employee handbook or code of 
conduct. See Levy, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 209, at 696 (explaining 
that the terms of an employee handbook can form an implied contract between 
an employer and an employee). 
 249. See Kayleigh McNelis, Off-Duty Statutes and Social Media: The Need 
for Protection Regardless of Whether Speech Is Concerted, 33 REV. LITIG. 219, 
237–42 (2014) (listing and analyzing states that have off-duty statutes that 
protect employees).  
 250. Id. at 237. 
 251. Id.  
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statutes are drafted somewhat vaguely and have been applied 
quite narrowly.252 
As to speech specifically, the National Labor Relations Board 
has held that concerted complaints about an employer (those 
made with an intention to enact change) on social media may be 
protected.253 Thus, an employer may not make a broad rule 
prohibiting all negative speech against an employer, which would 
necessarily include protected concerted activity.254 The problem 
with these limited protections, however, is that they do little to 
protect employees and other contracting parties from the 
potential abuses discussed above.255 Essentially, unless the 
employee is protesting her employer256 or smoking a cigarette,257 
she is on her own. 
D. Bargaining Power and Unilaterality 
The typical justification for a morality clause is preventative: 
businesses want to avoid any situation in which their associates 
embarrass them or tarnish their products.258 Additionally, in 
such an event, they want a solid justification to terminate the 
                                                                                                     
 252. See id. at 240–42 (noticing that a New York court interpreted their 
off-duty statute narrowly and that Colorado’s off-duty statute is overly vague).  
 253. See id. at 229 (“In recent years, the NLRB has extended further 
protection to employees making online comments about work.”). 
 254. See id. at 226–27 (declaring that the NLRA restricts an employer’s 
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 255. See Fleming, Cooley & McFadden-Wade, supra note 240, at 67–68 (“In 
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employment when an employee’s conduct is potentially detrimental to the 
employer’s interest.”). 
 256. See McNelis, supra note 249, at 227 (“[T]he employer must ensure the 
company’s social media policy is carefully crafted to prevent discriminatory 
conduct and unauthorized revelations without ‘chilling’ speech to which 
employees have a right under the NLRA.”). 
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 258. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
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protect the contracting company . . . .”).  
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offending associate—whether it is an employee, an independent 
contractor, or a business partner.259 
Nonetheless, the ambiguous nature of many morality clauses 
combined with their presentation in the context of unequal 
bargaining power may lead to situations in which the weaker 
party accepts without knowing the boundaries of the prohibited 
behavior or, perhaps more commonly, accepts without knowing 
the implications or intended enforcement of the clause.260 
Research in the area of non-competes suggests that the 
overwhelming majority of employees blindly accept employment 
restrictions without front-end negotiation or understanding of 
their potential implications.261 The same is likely true for 
morality clauses, whose inherent ambiguity lends them to 
confusion. 
Moreover, most morality clauses do not provide a mutuality 
of obligation.262 In the majority of clauses canvassed, the business 
imposed a duty on the other contracting party, but the duty to be 
moral, or more specifically, the duty to refrain from embarrassing 
was not reciprocal.263 Consider a situation in which a business is 
tainted by massive recall or a corporate scandal. It is foreseeable 
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corporate scandals high-profile people should seek a reverse morals clause) (on 
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 263. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 
6, at 353–57 (outlining various contracts with morality clauses). But see Taylor, 
III. et al., The Reverse-Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 80 (clarifying that in 
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clauses,” protecting them from the bad actions of the company, but these clauses 
are less common than traditional morality clauses and likely require high 
bargaining power). 
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that an endorser or even an employee would want to sever ties 
with the company based on its diminished reputation.264 In most 
morality clauses today, a company can terminate an agent for bad 
behavior, but the individual cannot do the same.265 As a result, 
the stronger parties benefit from morality clauses in that they 
can control the other party’s behavior and terminate for a broad 
and vague range of reasons, but the other party receives no 
benefit.266 
Due to the lack of mutuality, many morality clauses, 
standing alone, may be void for lack of consideration.267 
Consideration may also be lacking when the clause contains a 
promise to perform an existing legal obligation, or to forgo 
illegality. 268 The pre-existing duty rule holds that a promise to do 
what one is legally obligated to do is not valid consideration.269 
The rule is grounded in the notion that courts will not suppose 
that the promisor had any alternative but to conform to the law, 
and that therefore his promise to do so involves no detriment or 
forbearance. 
E. Privacy Rights 
By their very nature, Bad Behavior clauses restrict some 
legal acts that are deemed private.270 Assessing their breach will 
                                                                                                     
 264. See Herzfeld, supra note 262 (highlighting several examples of 
corporate scandals).  
 265. See id. (setting forth that there is a need for reverse morality clauses in 
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 266. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note 
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also necessarily involve intrusion into the subject’s private life.271 
Did the athlete commit adultery? Did the employee post a racist 
meme on his private Facebook page? Did the donor have a 
substance abuse problem? 
Although the spirit of morality clauses prevents the ill-effects 
of a negative association, on their face many Bad Behavior 
clauses prohibit off-duty conduct and speech regardless of 
ensuing public impact.272 It is not inconceivable that an employer, 
acting on rumor or suspicion or nothing at all, could peer into the 
private life of an employee to search for something “objectionable” 
to toll the morality clause. Recall the use of social media 
background checks discussed above.273 In light of the breadth of 
most morality clauses, he who seeks will likely find some skeleton 
to trigger the morality clause in most cases. Allowing powerful 
contracting parties—especially employers—unfettered access into 
the lives of others is unsound policy. 
Reputational Impact clauses, on the other hand, may be less 
invasive because they are premised on the notion that the 
offending act is public or otherwise known. This will certainly 
affect non-public figures more than public ones, as the law is 
clear that anything that occurs in the public eye is not private. At 
least one scholar has argued that it is an open question whether 
traditionally-worded morality clauses contain an implicit waiver 
of privacy rights.274 
Although they purport to limit immoral behavior and protect 
reputation—which at first glance are good things—morality 
clauses can be socially harmful and should be duly scrutinized. 
The following section offers a framework for their analysis that 
balances their legitimate justifications against their potential for 
abuse.  
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 271. See id. at 462 (considering public prying into personal lives of athletes).  
 272. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 209–11 (describing the 
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IV. A Model Test for Morality Clauses 
Scrutiny of morality clauses will necessarily involve a 
two-step determination. First, courts should analyze the clause 
itself to see if it is enforceable. Morality clauses might be deemed 
unenforceable for vagueness, lack of consideration, duress, or any 
other contract fault.275 We contend that they should also be 
vetted for public policy considerations, such as restraint on legal 
speech and the burden on the promisee. Second, courts must 
determine whether, in the case of an otherwise enforceable 
morality clause, such clause was violated by the acts of the 
allegedly offending party. This is a highly subjective assessment, 
involving a keen understanding of dominant mores, the impact 
(or foreseeability of the impact) of the offending behavior, and the 
terminating party’s true intent. 
Because the determination of the validity and applicability of 
morality clauses is fraught with legal, normative, and moral 
issues, we offer a factored approach to their analysis. The 
following five factors will guide courts in establishing the 
enforceability and fair disposition of morality clause cases.276 
Each factor, as well as the rubric’s structure, is influenced by 
well-established legal tests in other comparable areas, such as 
employment law, the law of non-competes, intellectual property 
law, and psychology. Employment law informs the proper 
balancing of employer and employee rights with regard to 
employee off-duty behavior. The common law limitations on 
restraints of trade provide a relevant logic and structure in 
assessing morality clauses.277 Finally, concepts borrowed from 
trademark law and psychology instruct on the reasonableness of 
associations between an individual and a business or product.278 
Like other legal factor tests, we propose that each factor is 
assessed on a sliding scale. Although the preponderance of factors 
can be determinative, a sliding scale approach allows for 
                                                                                                     
 275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 33(2), 71, 174–77 (AM. 
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CONTRACTING CORRECTNESS 51 
increased reliance on a single factor at the discretion of the 
courts. 
The following framework submits that a valid morality 
clause must be justified by a business interest and that there 
must be a reasonable connection in the public’s minds between 
the restricted party and the imposing party.279 A strong public 
association between the individual and the business can 
legitimize a morality clause; a weak one should not. We propose a 
practicable standard for its measure. Next the test considers the 
scope and definiteness of the restriction, with the logic that 
contracting parties should be aware of the behavior that will toll 
the clause’s termination rights.280 A third factor explores the 
impact of the offending behavior to study whether a termination 
is warranted and in good faith.281 Finally, the rubric gauges the 
burden on the contracting party.282 A contract restricting legal 
rights and speech should be carefully balanced against the 
business’s rights and take into account the mutuality of the 
obligation and the role and relative bargaining power of the 
parties.  
A. Nexus Between Misconduct and Business Interest 
A basic tenet of agency law is that the nature of the business 
and the position of the agent determine what conduct can be 
expected from him.283 It follows that a morality clause should be 
reasonably tailored to protect a legitimate interest or mission of 
the business. Of course, every business has a general interest in 
maintaining a good reputation. While reasonable, this alone 
should not be enough to restrict the legal behavior and speech of 
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its agents. Businesses seeking the enforceability of their morality 
clauses should further justify the nexus between the misconduct 
and their business interest or mission. 
Our proposed nexus requirement is consistent with the 
standards reflected in state wrongful discharge statutes and 
federal government employment.284 While these laws do not 
involve private contracts and the federal rules do not govern the 
private sector, their spirit, which is to prevent capricious and 
pretextual acts, is instructive.285 
Some employment-at-will states have wrongful discharge 
statutes to protect employees from being fired for legal, off-duty 
conduct that is unrelated to their job.286 Similarly, the federal 
government prohibits removal from a civil service position where 
private misconduct does not implicate “official responsibilities in 
any direct and obvious way.”287 A federal agency may remove an 
employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the 
service.”288 Before removing an employee for off-duty misconduct, 
an agency must make two determinations: (1) that the employee 
actually committed the conduct; and (2) that removal will 
promote the efficiency of the service.289 The agency must show 
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COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2016). 
 287. Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
 288. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012).  
 289. Sherman v. Alexander, 684 F.2d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Young 
v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
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that the off-duty conduct has some connection to the employee’s 
or agency’s overall performance.290 To determine whether such 
nexus exists, courts and arbitrators focus on (1) harm to an 
employer’s reputation or product, (2) the ability of an offending 
employee to perform assigned duties or to appear at work, or 
(3) the refusal or reluctance of other employees to work with the 
person charged with off-duty misconduct.291 Cases are the 
hardest when a good, low-level employee does something off-duty 
of which the employer disapproves. 
Reported cases add flesh to these rules. Where there is little 
connection between the agency’s mission or the job description 
and the misconduct, courts generally reject discharges for 
off-duty conduct. In one case, a NASA employee who was fired for 
homosexual off-duty conduct was reinstated because the record 
established no “ascertainable deleterious effect on the efficiency 
of the service.”292 In another, a court found that the Postal 
Service’s dismissal of a letter carrier after his conviction of 
possession of a small amount of illegal drugs in no way affected 
his job.293 Courts have even required a nexus in cases involving 
grossly immoral conduct. In one case the Navy dismissed a 
civilian diesel mechanic with strong on-the-job performance after 
his conviction of child molestation.294 The Navy contended that, 
even though it had not been a source of notoriety or public shame, 
the former employee’s behavior dampened the Navy’s “confidence 
in his judgment” and cast doubts on his moral standards.295 In 
finding insufficient nexus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that 
“[c]onclusory statements of distrust fall far short of the 
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substantial evidence required to remove” the employee.296 A Fifth 
Circuit case with similar facts reached the same conclusion: A 
postal worker charged with indecency with a child kept his job 
because it did not involve interaction with children and the 
agency could not prove more than the generalized 
reprehensibility of the conduct.297 
Courts reach a different conclusion in cases in which the 
offending conduct undermines the mission of the agency. The 
Federal Circuit found that the Marine Corps was justified in 
firing a recreational manager for having an affair with a 
serviceman’s wife.298 Since the manager’s job involved supporting 
military personnel and their families, his off-duty misconduct, 
although personal, affected the very mission of his division and 
lessened the confidence that departing military spouses might 
have in the program.299 The Seventh Circuit determined that the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) could 
legitimately fire an otherwise effective employee who was a 
known slumlord.300 In a commonsensical evaluation arguing that 
behavior inconsistent with mission justifies termination, Judge 
Posner stated as follows: 
If an employee of a manufacturer of safes moonlighted as a 
safe cracker, his days as an employee of that manufacturer 
would be numbered, even if he scrupulously avoided cracking 
safes manufactured by his employer. If an officer of a 
musicians’ union owned a nightclub that employed non-union 
musicians, because their wages were lower, his days as an 
employee of the union would be numbered. A customs officer 
caught smuggling, an immigration officer caught employing 
illegal aliens, an IRS employee who files false income tax 
returns, a HUD appraiser moonlighting as a “slumlord”—these 
are merely the public counterparts of a form of conflict of 
interest that is not less serious for not being financial, that 
would not be tolerated in the private sector, and that we do not 
believe Congress meant to sanctify in the public sector.301 
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Measuring the nexus between the nature of the misconduct 
and the business interest or mission is easiest when the interest 
or mission is definite. A law firm has a business interest in 
ensuring that its lawyers do not embezzle client funds or cheat 
the government. However, it has less of a business interest in 
meddling into the extramarital affairs of its lawyers because 
absent an office scandal, the nexus is significantly attenuated. 
B. Degree of Meaning Transfer: What is the Likelihood of 
Association? 
Not every agent has the same degree of representative 
power. In assessing the fairness and enforceability of a morality 
clause, courts should examine the degree that the agent is or can 
be associated with the business in the minds of the public. We 
referenced this theory above as “meaning transfer,”302 or the 
attachment and flow of cultural meanings from one person to a 
product or organization.303 An individual with little or no public 
association with a business is unlikely to have the power to 
publicly shame it. In this case, restrictions on off-duty conduct 
are less justifiable. 
We can measure the degree of association by borrowing a 
tenet of trademark law. Like morality clauses, trademark law 
looks to protect a business’s established goodwill and reputation 
from those who may tarnish it.304 Trademark law assesses 
infringement by asking “what is the likelihood of consumer 
confusion?”305 Here, we may determine the legitimacy of the 
morality clause by asking “what is the likelihood of consumer 
association?” That is, would the consuming public associate the 
individual and his off-duty antics with the business? A high 
likelihood of consumer association is direct evidence of a 
protectable business interest in reputation and also indicative of 
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Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. 
L.J. 121, 124 (1996) (discussing the purpose of trademark protections). 
 305. See id. at 122–23 (discussing consumer confusion and trademark law). 
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the potential negative impact of the misconduct. We elucidate 
with categorization and examples. 
In a class by themselves are professions with inherent 
morality requirements, which the public recognizes. Individuals 
charged with the care of children, money, and the public trust 
have a heightened morality requirement implicit in their 
professional duties; they are caretakers and must demonstrate 
good sense and judgment.306 Journalists must maintain the 
appearance of neutrality.307 Lawyers, judges, and police officers 
must respect the law. Religious leaders must practice what they 
preach.308 Simply put, the misdeeds of those in certain 
professions are subject to higher public scrutiny because of their 
inherent symbolism, whether or not they are public figures. 
Judges represent the law as preachers represent the church. A 
rupture in any of these social performances diminishes the 
effectiveness of the individual and casts a negative light on both 
the associated establishment and the general institution.309 
Endorsement or sponsorship relationships are another 
category of a heightened consumer association, as their very 
purpose is to create a positive meaning transfer. Athletes, artists, 
and other celebrities entering into these agreements are 
sophisticated contracting parties with high degrees of bargaining 
power and representation.310 It is worth noting that endorsement 
relationships can also be found in company to company 
agreements. For instance, before the 2002 Winter Olympic 
Games, several corporate sponsors of the global event voiced 
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concerns regarding a prior bribery scandal.311 As a result, those 
sponsors and the International Olympic Committee included 
morality clauses in each of their agreements.312 
Other relationships carrying associative power are less clear, 
perhaps because their representative role is secondary to other 
duties. A CEO, for example, runs a company but also often serves 
as its public face.313 A particularly charismatic or famous 
executive (like Martha Stewart, Lee Iacocca, or the late Steve 
Jobs) becomes synonymous with her or his company. An on-air 
personality’s primary role is to entertain or report, but he can 
also be said to represent his employer. Recall the case of baseball 
analyst Curt Schilling, who was fired from ESPN for sharing an 
offensive photo about transgender people on Facebook.314 
Similarly, board members and major donors, when public, have 
the potential of high meaning transfer. Cases abound in which 
donations have been returned or naming rights revoked in fear of 
a negative association.315 
Finally, there is the lowest level of meaning transfer: the 
low-profile agent. Businesses may legitimately have an interest 
in ensuring the decent, lawful behavior of all of their employees 
to ensure a good culture or to avoid negative press. However, 
when the behavior restriction constrains the legal off-duty 
conduct of agents with low meaning transfer, it may not be 
justifiable because there is a negligible foreseeable impact on the 
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business’s reputation. In other words, if the public does not 
associate a disgraced individual with his company, his bad 
behavior or its fallout should not be grounds for dismissal. This is 
necessarily a fact- and context-specific analysis because 
depending on the circumstances, agents at all levels can have 
representative power. Consider the fast food worker who appears 
in a shocking YouTube video in company uniform, or the delivery 
driver identified as a company employee in news reports detailing 
his drug arrest.316 
C. The Scope and Definiteness of the Restrictive Clause 
Next, an enforceable morality clause should be sufficiently 
narrow and definite so as to allow a party to predict with 
reasonable certainty what conduct will trigger the clause. As 
discussed above, to be enforceable, a contract must be reasonably 
definite in its terms.317 Beyond this relatively low standard, when 
a particularly restrictive clause is involved, there is a general 
interest in ensuring that parties have the ability to actually 
understand what it is they are agreeing to. For example, courts 
generally require that exculpatory clauses meet a higher level of 
clarity to be enforceable.318 Likewise, in inspecting a morality 
clause, a party should be able to reasonably predict what conduct 
would violate the agreement. 
A problem arises, however, when the majority of morality 
clauses are drafted very broadly and give the imposing party the 
power to interpret the clause. Recall the Los Angeles County 
morality clause, which prohibits any behavior that would “be an 
embarrassment to the County.”319 The handbook gives no 
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direction as to what type of behavior would embarrass the county. 
Would commissioners be embarrassed by an employee’s 
solicitation of a prostitute? What about an employee’s gender 
reassignment surgery? Would an employee’s extramarital affair 
be an embarrassment? Clauses of such breadth make this 
determination very difficult, if not impossible. 
Further, while public morals are already quickly changing 
and difficult to follow, the morals of an individual company or 
supervisor could be even more fleeting. This requires the 
restricted party to determine at any given time who at the 
company would make the decision to terminate and whether that 
particular person would be offended by some certain action. By 
contrast, a morality clause that is interpreted under a community 
or reasonable person standard would be more concrete and 
predictable. 
With regard to covenants not to compete, the majority of 
states have found that to be enforceable, the clause must be 
“narrowly tailored” to protect a legitimate business interest.320 
Similarly, businesses should be required to draft morality clauses 
in sufficiently definite terms so as to allow the restricted party to 
predict violating behavior with relative ease. 
1. Legal Behavior 
Courts should analyze morality clauses that prohibit legal 
behavior with higher scrutiny than those that are triggered only 
by unlawful activity. Simply put, there is minimal public interest 
in preventing parties from discouraging illegal conduct. Note that 
as a basic tenant of contract law, a restricted party’s promise not 
to engage in illegal behavior cannot even constitute valid 
consideration, as he is not giving up any existing rights.321 
On the other hand, most employees and contracting parties 
would likely agree that while they are off the clock, their 
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 321. See Patterson, supra note 269, at 938 (discussing clauses concerning 
illegal behavior).  
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employer’s control over their legal conduct should be greatly 
limited, if not nonexistent. It is under this rationale that four 
states have made it unlawful for an employer to terminate an 
employee based on legal, off-duty conduct.322 For instance, a 
California statute broadly prohibits adverse employment action 
“for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away 
from the employer’s premises.”323 In enacting the law, the 
California legislature recognized the public policy of “protecting 
the [civil] rights of individual employees . . . who could not 
otherwise afford to protect themselves.”324 
Overall, there is considerable worth in upholding the division 
between the home and the workplace, as employees should 
generally be free from their employers’ restrictions outside of 
working hours. However, where a morality clause merely 
prohibits illegal behavior, the policy supporting this division is 
much more limited. 
2. Prohibiting Speech 
As to morality clauses prohibiting speech, courts should 
apply a heightened scrutiny. In a difficult economy, the need for 
gainful employment can make an employee quite willing to give 
up certain rights. But when a person seeks to surrender a right 
as paramount as the freedom of speech, public policy supports 
giving the agreement a closer look. 
It is of course true that while the First Amendment protects 
the free-speech rights of government employees, no such 
protection exists as to private employees and contractors.325 This 
                                                                                                     
 322. See McNelis, supra note 249, at 238 (discussing state limitation on 
adverse action based on off-duty conduct). 
 323. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2016); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201–d 
(McKinney 2016) (making it illegal for an employer to terminate an employee 
based on off-duty political and recreational activities). 
 324. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?: 
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct As the Basis for Adverse Employment 
Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 647 (2004) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE 
§ 98.6 note (West 2003) (historical and statutory notes)). 
 325. See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and 
Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20 (1998) (noting the lack of free speech 
protections in private workplaces). 
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would likely come as a surprise to a great percentage of American 
workers who believe their freedom of expression is more 
inclusive.326 Some legal scholars have gone so far as to argue that 
First Amendment protections should be extended to employees of 
corporations.327 
The policy supporting free speech is especially strong when 
the speech is political or religious in nature. Regardless of its lack 
of private protection, the First Amendment still gives valuable 
insight into the public policy surrounding free speech,328 and as 
stated by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, 
“political speech [is] at the core of what the First Amendment is 
designed to protect.”329 Accordingly, some states already explicitly 
recognize this public policy in protecting a private employee’s free 
speech rights.330 
It is important to reiterate here that this Article does not 
argue that the mere fact that a morality clause restricts speech 
makes that clause invalid. Again, like all factors under this 
proposed test, the scope of the clause is part of a sliding scale. 
Still, a broad clause that prohibits significant legal activity and 
speech, particularly political speech, should slide ever closer 
towards unenforceability. 
                                                                                                     
 326. See Aaron Kirkland, Note, “You Got Fired? On Your Day Off?!”: 
Challenging Termination of Employees for Personal Blogging Practices, 75 
UMKC L. REV. 545, 550 n.45 (2006) (citing Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with 
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an 
At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133 (1997) (reporting that employees 
surveyed “reveal[ed] a striking level of misunderstanding among respondents of 
the most basic legal rules governing the [at-will] employment relationship”)). 
 327. See, e.g., Adam S. Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights Trump Individual 
Rights? Preserving an Individual Rights Model in a Pluralist Society, 44 COLUM. 
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 267, 309 (2011) [hereinafter Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights 
Trump Individual Rights] (discussing free speech rights in the private sector). 
 328. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898–99 (1983) 
(holding that concern for rights of political expression under the First 
Amendment is sufficient to state public policy applicable to private employers 
under Pennsylvania law). 
 329. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003). 
 330. Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights Trump Individual Rights, supra note 
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 273–74. 
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D. Impact of Offending Behavior 
Whether it is worded as a Bad Behavior or a Reputational 
Impact clause, fairly enforcing a morality clause should require a 
showing that the offending behavior (a) actually occurred, (b) is 
known or likely to be known, and (c) is likely to cause damage to 
the imposing party.331 We address each assessment in turn. 
1. Actual Occurrence 
 A grave injustice would ensue if the law allowed for the 
termination of an agent who was merely the victim of defamation. 
However, a rumor can cause reputational damage whether true 
or false—and companies can be quick to the trigger to distance 
themselves from possible scandal.332 In the event that credible 
evidence contradicts allegations of misbehavior, the enforcement 
of a morality clause is weakened. After all, most morality clauses 
are premised on the actual happening of the offending event and 
even in circumstances where a falsity might injure an employer’s 
reputation, it should be assumed that publication of the truth will 
repair any damage. 
2. Known or Likely to be Known 
If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, 
does it make a sound? If a consultant tries cocaine and only his 
boss knows it, does it affect the business enough to justify 
termination? The answer to the second question depends in part 
on the publicity—or the publicity potential—of the information. 
In today’s world, this is relatively easy element to prove, as 
anything posted online for more than one person to see would 
certainly meet the publicity requirement. Like established 
principles in defamation law, broad dissemination should not be 
                                                                                                     
 331. See Infra Part IV.D (discussing different impacts of immoral employee 
behavior). 
 332. See Robert D. Highfill, The Effects of News of Crime and Scandal upon 
Public Opinion, 17 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 40–41 (1926) (discussing the 
impact of scandal on public opinion). 
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required.333 Even knowledge spreading to one client can affect a 
business. Private misbehavior should be beyond the reach of 
meddling employers, but the more the information spreads, the 
more likely that it will have a noxious impact on the employer. 
3. Likely to Cause Damage to the Imposing Party 
A general morality clause should only be enforceable if the 
imposing party can prove that the offending behavior caused 
harm or that reputational harm is reasonably foreseeable given 
the facts. This is consistent with principles of employment law 
and with the spirit of most morality clauses. 
It is often difficult for imposing parties to prove the negative 
impact of publicity. In some cases, the terminating party can offer 
evidence of customer complaints, adverse media coverage, a 
chorus of backlash on social media, or even a decrease in sales or 
a boycott. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, discussed above, involved 
this quantum of proof.334 When the company’s endorser—a well-
known athlete—posted politically unpopular social media 
comments, Hanesbrands fired him immediately under a 
Reputational Impact clause giving it the right to terminate for a 
public scandal.335 The athlete’s arguments defeated the motion 
for judgment on the pleadings because, while there was evidence 
that the post offended some, there was also evidence that others 
supported his thinking.336 With this in mind, the court held that 
it was necessary for the company to prove the existence of a 
verifiable public scandal in order to defeat a claim of breach of 
good faith and fair dealing.337 
Given the realities of modern business and communications, 
requiring the showing of an actual adverse impact is too difficult 
a burden. Direct proof of adverse reaction or reputational harm is 
                                                                                                     
 333. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF 
TORTS § 519 (2d ed. June 2016 Update) (discussing the elements of a defamation 
claim). 
 334. See 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (2012) (discussing reputational harms 
from social media postings).  
 335. Id. at 720. 
 336. Id. at 727–28. 
 337. Id.  
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always difficult to prove. In fact, most employment arbitrators 
generally reject such a requirement in the federal employment 
context.338 Firms should not have to wait for negative 
consequences before firing an agent who is a ticking time bomb. 
But how far should a court go in inferring reputational damage? 
Weighing the likelihood of disclosure, courts should assess 
the potential for future adverse impact by asking: If the public 
discovered the information, would the imposing party’s 
reputation be negatively affected? This analysis hinges on the 
particular facts of the case and reasonably-based public 
perception. 
E. Burden on the Restricted Party 
Finally, in analyzing a morality clause, courts should 
consider the burden the clause places upon the restricted party, 
balancing it against the interests of the imposing party. As 
discussed in detail with regard to scope and definiteness,339 
morality clauses often significantly restrain an employee’s or 
associate’s freedom of expression and freedom to engage in other 
legal activity outside of the workplace. Further, they can blur the 
already fading line between work and home life, when employees 
are constantly under the scrutiny of their employers. 
1. Parties’ Relative Bargaining Power 
An additional concern for restricted parties is their relative 
lack of bargaining power when considering agreements 
containing morality clauses, particularly in the employment 
context.340 While an employee could theoretically negotiate the 
terms of her employment to limit or eliminate the clause, in 
reality, most prospective employees lack such power.341 As of 
                                                                                                     
 338. Snow, The Long Arm of the Boss, supra note 291, at 14. 
 339. See supra Part IV.C (discussing scope and definiteness). 
 340. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 139, 143  (2005) (arguing that courts look to limited circumstances in 
regards to bargaining power, often failing to consider certain asymmetries like a 
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 341. Id. 
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early 2017, the U–6 rate (economists’ preferred measure for 
unemployment in the United States) remained at around 9.4%.342 
In most cases today, employment is a buyer’s market. While 
estimates vary, sources have reported that somewhere between 
59 and 250 potential employees apply for the average job 
opening.343 
Most people who have looked for work in recent years can 
attest that the process is lengthy.344 One must search for position 
openings, draft cover letters, submit applications, attend 
interviews, wait for the completion of background checks, 
complete human resources documentation, etc. When considering 
the process and the above-cited employment statistics, it is not 
surprising that only around 10% of those offered jobs turn them 
down.345 For most, it seems unlikely that after finally obtaining a 
sought-after position, the candidate would contest a contractual 
provision requiring him to exercise good behavior or avoid 
causing embarrassment. Most peoples’ optimism bias would 
certainly convince them to believe they are not likely to behave 
badly—or suffer the ill-effects of a harshly-enforced morality 
clause.  
As a general contract principle, such limited bargaining 
power can at times lead to the invalidation of agreements.346 
When invalidating agreements on the grounds of 
                                                                                                     
 342. Nicholas Wells, Unemployment Rose Slightly in January, but a More 
Realistic Rate is Even Higher, CNBC (Feb. 3, 2017, 9:16 AM), 
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Lee Law Review). 
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 345. See id. (“[R]oughly one in 10 people who are offered a job turn it 
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 346. See Lonegrass, supra note 157, at 5 (discussing the unconscionability of 
standardized forms between large corporations and consumers).  
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unconscionability, courts look to whether the contract was 
procedurally unconscionable, “indicating that the transaction 
lacked meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party.”347 
In terms of morality clauses, this highlights the important 
distinction between a high-profile party to an endorsement 
agreement (who has significant bargaining power) and the 
average employee (who has very little).348 
2. Employee’s Reputation 
While the purpose of a morality clause is to protect the image 
of the imposing party, it is also necessary to consider the 
reputation and future opportunities of the restricted party. While 
it is certainly true that any harm to the employee’s reputation is 
the result of events she herself set in motion, in some situations, 
the employee should be entitled to repose. 
However, a morality clause may cause an ill-advised action 
or statement to follow an employee much longer than it would 
absent the clause.349 An employee who is terminated from a 
long-term position pursuant to a morality clause based on some 
insensitive off-duty statement will likely be required to disclose 
this statement to his next potential employer, thereby harming 
his chances of future employment.350 
In some jurisdictions, the law of defamation recognizes this 
concern in the employment context. In order to establish a claim 
for defamation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a 
statement tending to harm the plaintiff’s reputation.351 The 
plaintiff must also show that the defendant somehow “published” 
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the statement or made it available to the public.352 Over the past 
few decades, however, courts have begun to recognize the 
doctrine of compelled self-publication.353 That is, a 
plaintiff/employee can establish the publication element if it is 
foreseeable that he himself would have to repeat the defamatory 
remarks when applying for future positions.354 
For instance, in Brown v. M. Caratan, Inc.,355 an employer 
terminated an employee, claiming she had lied on application 
documents.356 In deciding that “it was foreseeable that [the 
employee] would be compelled in future interviews to explain her 
former employer’s proffered justification for firing her,” the 
Eastern District of California held that the employee had 
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on 
her self-defamation claim.357 
The doctrine of self-publication thus recognizes that 
employees will likely be required to divulge details of a 
termination to future potential employers.358 With regard to 
morality clauses, in the modern economy where businesses of all 
kinds are highly protective of their images, disclosure of a 
termination for some past unwise statement could significantly 
impact one’s employment prospects, even if that statement was 
relatively minor and made years earlier.359 In sum, there are 
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certain situations where the potential harm to an employee 
greatly outweighs the likely harm to her employer.360 
F. Application of the Model Test 
An exercise in applying the factors is instructive in proving 
their logic and practicability. What follows are five illustrations 
based loosely on documented case law, media reports, and 
existing morality clauses. An analysis based on the five factors 
supplements. 
ILLUSTRATION 1361 
A marketing firm for lawyers hires a famous actor as its 
spokesperson. The morality clause provides that the firm can 
terminate the relationship if the endorser does anything to 
embarrass it. Later, the firm learns that the actor appeared on 
the internet in a comedy skit making fun of plaintiffs’ attorneys. 
A quick internet search uncovers that he has recently engaged in 
a bar fight. 
                                                                                                     
settled without discussion, on the merits, of the relationship between morality 
clauses and the use of social media. See Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall 
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 361. This illustration is loosely based on the facts of Bernsen v. Innovative 
Legal Marketing, LLC, 885 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
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• Nexus: The actor’s participation in the skit has a strong 
nexus to his role as a proponent of legal services. That negative 
association undermines the purpose of the contract. The nexus is 
significantly more tenuous as it relates to the bar fight. 
• Meaning Transfer: The primary purpose of an 
endorsement agreement is to achieve meaning transfer, thus 
meeting this factor. 
• Scope of Clause: The wide breadth of the clause prohibits 
legal speech and expression; however, this may be justified in 
light of the party’s bargaining power and purpose of the 
endorsement agreement. 
• Impact: The offending acts are known because they were 
posted on the internet. The well-known actor is likely to garner 
attention on the internet due to his fame. Humiliating lawyers is 
reasonably going to embarrass legal marketers. 
• Burden: This endorsement agreement is not the actor’s 
primary employment and he enjoys a high degree of bargaining 
power.  
• RESULT: The factors weigh heavily in favor of the 
enforceability of the clause. 
ILLUSTRATION 2362 
The employment contract between a college football coach 
and a major university provides that he will not engage in 
conduct “that brings the University into disrepute; or that reflects 
dishonesty, disloyalty, willful misconduct, gross negligence, moral 
turpitude or refusal or unwillingness to perform his duties.” The 
police arrest the coach for domestic battery. ESPN’s cameras 
record the moment the coach was booked, and the network 
broadcasts these images nationally. 
• Nexus: While highly reprehensible, the football coach’s 
private domestic dispute has little to do with his primary role as 
a coach, which is to train his athletes and lead his team to 
success.  
                                                                                                     
 362. The illustration is loosely based on the facts of Haywood v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 976 F. Supp. 2d 606 (W.D. Pa. 2013). 
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• Meaning Transfer: Though secondary to his athletic 
responsibilities, as the head of a football program at a major 
university, the coach is high-profile figurehead and a leader and 
role model to players and fans alike. His private actions do 
represent his institution. 
• Scope of Clause: As enforced here, the morality clause 
attempts to terminate the employee over allegations of illegal 
behavior, actions that deserve the lowest protection.  
• Impact: As the subject of indisputable national media 
coverage, the coach’s actions will certainly impact the university, 
which will presumably receive strong pressure to distance itself 
from one of its most high-profile (and highly paid) employees. If it 
does not, the school could be perceived as condoning the actions 
and become the subject of further negative attention or even 
boycotts. 
• Burden: The coach’s high-level success in sports likely 
granted him significant bargaining power when signing the 
agreement with the university. Further, any negative impact on 
his reputation would be the result of the domestic battery itself, 
rather than from the termination of his contract. 
• RESULT: The factors weigh heavily in favor of the 
enforceability of the clause. 
ILLUSTRATION 3363 
A small private university hires a married man as an 
assistant director of financial aid. The employment contract 
includes a clause stating, “as a Christian institution, the 
university requires all administrators to exercise strong family 
values.” During the term of the contract, the director’s wife files 
for divorce after she discovers he has had multiple recent affairs. 
The director’s home life becomes the subject of gossip among 
school employees and students, and the university terminates his 
employment pursuant to the clause. 
• Nexus: The administrator’s private life does not have a 
nexus to his daily professional responsibilities, nor is he a role 
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model or figurehead. However, the institution’s clear mission is 
articulated and clear and it is reasonable for it to require its 
employees to exercise and model it, even in their private lives, if 
they freely agree to it in advance. 
• Meaning Transfer: As the subject is a relatively low-profile 
employee, meaning transfer is likely to be limited. Still, the fact 
that employees and students became privy to the information 
could create the impression on-campus that the small university 
does not in fact uphold Christian family values. 
• Scope of Clause: The clause in this case is broad but clear: 
it requires the exercise of “strong family values,” and cites 
Christianity as the framework for determining such values. The 
employee could have quite easily predicted that adultery would 
be a violation of the clause. 
• Impact: Although major economic consequences seem 
unlikely, with regard to those who know the on-campus gossip, 
the director’s conduct may undermine the mission of the school. 
This climate could affect employee culture and student morale. 
• Burden: In this case, the low-profile employee likely had 
minimal power to negotiate the terms of the agreement. On the 
other hand, an employee’s past infidelity is not likely the type of 
behavior that would prevent him from obtaining future 
employment, at least at secular universities and businesses. 
• RESULT: Due largely to the morality clause’s clarity and 
ease of predictability, the factors weigh in favor of enforceability. 
ILLUSTRATION 4364 
An employment agreement between ABC insurance company 
and a claims adjuster includes the following provision: “Team 
Members should avoid off-duty behavior that would have a 
negative impact on their job performance at the Company, 
conflict with their obligations to the Company, or in any way 
negatively affect the Company’s reputation.” ABC discovers that 
the claims adjuster, an employee of five years, recently created 
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and posted a racially-insensitive meme on his personal (but not 
private) Facebook page that poked fun at Asian-American 
drivers. The meme, which went viral, received significant 
negative online feedback. 
• Nexus: The employee’s behavior, although potentially 
offensive, has a weak nexus to his role as an insurance adjuster. 
The company’s best argument (and one that is often attempted) is 
that the act shows overall poor judgment and that this, by 
extension, can affect his professional performance. This is a 
tenuous proposition. 
• Meaning Transfer: Although the claims adjuster acts as 
the face of the company with individual clients, the general public 
is unlikely to transfer his bad behavior onto his employer. 
• Scope of Clause: The wide breadth of the clause effectively 
pokes a hole in the contract, allowing unilateral termination and 
overuse over something relatively minor. 
• Impact: The offending acts are known because they 
garnered significant online attention. However, nothing in the 
post suggests an association with the employer, so it is unlikely 
that it will have a negative effect on its reputation. Given the 
ease of posting feedback online, the fact that the comment got 
much online feedback does not mean that it created a scandal. 
• Burden: Like most rank-and-file employees who sign form 
employment contracts, the employee had little bargaining power 
over this ambiguous clause. A termination would have a negative 
impact on the employee of five years, who almost certainly would 
have to disclose the cause for termination to future employers. 
• RESULT: The factors weigh against the application of the 
clause to terminate the employee. 
 
ILLUSTRATION 5365 
A freelance cellphone application developer enters into an 
independent contractor agreement to create an educational app 
for a children’s television show. The contract includes a clause 
that generally prohibits the developer’s “moral turpitude.” During 
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the engagement, the app developer competes in a bikini contest 
broadcast nationally on raunchy late night television show. On 
the show, she mentions that she creates children’s apps, but does 
not mention for whom. 
• Nexus: At first blush, appearing scantily-clad on television 
has little to do with developing software. The company may argue 
that because she was engaged to develop content relating to 
children’s education, a nexus is present.  
• Meaning Transfer: This relationship has a very low degree 
of meaning transfer. App developers work behind the scenes and 
are not generally known to the public. She is not a fulltime 
employee. These factors militate against a finding of meaning 
transfer. 
• Scope of Clause: A party should be able to reasonably 
predict what conduct would violate the agreement. This a 
temporary engagement and the clause does not state or reference 
the mission of the company with regard to children. Moreover, 
while not necessarily professional or prudent, the app developer’s 
conduct was neither illegal nor ignominious. 
• Impact: Even though this segment was broadcast 
nationally, the general public is not likely to associate the 
subject’s identity with the company’s, and therefore there will 
likely be little to no impact. 
• Burden: The freelance developer has relatively little 
bargaining power, but it must be noted that any burden on her 
future reputation may have been caused by her own appearance 
on the show. 
• RESULT: The factors weigh against the application of the 
clause to terminate the app developer. 
By taking into account the role of the employee, the 
predictability and breadth of the clause, and its foreseeable 
impact on the company and burden on the individual, morality 
clauses can be tailored to attend to the legitimate business 
interests of the imposing party while at the same time respecting 
the liberty and privacy of the individual. 
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V. Conclusion 
In a pre-internet case examining the fairness of a 
non-contractual termination for off-duty conduct, Judge Posner 
commented that, “where an employee’s off-duty behavior is 
blatantly inconsistent with the mission of the employer and is 
known or likely to become known, most any employer, public or 
private, however broadminded, would want to fire the employee 
and would be reasonable in wanting to do so.”366 While, in certain 
circumstances, imposing parties should be able to employ and 
enforce morality clauses, the law must have a balanced standard 
for analyzing their enforceability.367 The unfettered use of 
morality clauses can be socially harmful and unjust.368 
Remaining unchecked, these restrictions can be loopholes for 
terminations in bad faith, pretexts for discrimination, and vague, 
unilateral limitations enforced at the imposing party’s whim and 
subject to the ever-changing social and political tides.369 
The internet and social media have blurred the boundary 
between on- and off-duty conduct, leading individuals of all ranks 
to be subject to public scrutiny and potential scandal.370 While 
this provides an additional incentive to companies seeking to 
deploy such clauses, this Article argues that it is not always a 
justification for a blanket restraint on legal behavior and speech. 
After canvassing the various legal and public policy pressure 
points inherent in morality clauses, this Article establishes a 
rubric for their analysis. Our framework proposes examining 
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morality clauses and their enforceability along five factors: nexus, 
meaning transfer, scope, impact, and burden.  
Simply put, morality clauses should be enforceable only when 
(1) there is a reasonable nexus between the offending activity and 
the imposing party’s legitimate business interests, (2) those 
business interests are definite enough so as to assist a reasonable 
person in predicting what is prohibited, and (3) the offending 
activity causes or will foreseeably cause a reputational backlash 
against the imposing party. In addition, courts should examine 
(4) the degree of meaning transfer, or associative power that the 
restricted party has with the company in the public’s esteem. For 
instance, the private, moral failings of low-level employees may 
be unlikely to mar an employer, but when the purpose of the 
contract is to create an association or endorsement, the scales tip 
in favor of the imposing party. Finally, courts should scrutinize 
(5) the burden imposed on the restricted party, as morality 
clauses can especially harm individuals with little bargaining 
power.  
An ex ante restriction on any behavior or speech that is 
“potentially embarrassing” forces people into an imagined 
conformity and “press conference” behavior both on and off the 
job.371 This chills speech, innovation, and challenges to the status 
quo, not to mention forcing employees to check many of their 
legal rights at their employer’s door.372 Analyzing morality 
clauses through the five-pronged analysis allows for their more 
efficient, balanced, and just use and enforcement. 
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